

JPRS-USA-86-007

23 JULY 1986

USSR Report

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 4, APRIL 1986



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[Translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.]

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PUBLICATION DATA

English title : USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No 4, April 1986

Russian title : SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA

Author (s) :

Editor (s) : V. M. Berezhkov

Publishing House : Izdatelstvo "Nauka"

Place of publication : Moscow

Date of publication : April 1986

Signed to press : 19 March 1986

Copies : 30,000

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politika, ideologiya", 1986

LENINIST CONCEPT OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE EXAMINED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 86 (signed to press 19 Mar 86) pp 3-13

[Article by D. G. Tomashevskiy: "The Leninist Concept of Peaceful Coexistence and the Realities of Our Time"]

[Text] The crucial nature of the present stage in the historical process, a nature that was deeply and broadly analyzed in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th party congress, forcibly makes itself known in the sphere of international relations. Their development had currently reached a critical point: For the first time in history one can speak about the preservation of civilization and of life itself. The stern realities of our time subject to verification the political courses of countries and the positions of the political parties, the theoretical concepts and practical actions, and the degree of their adequacy to the vital needs of the moment. International reality imperiously demands the re-examination of the customary concepts and traditional ideas concerning the purpose and means of foreign policy. Many ideas which not too long ago were considered correct and apparently unshakeable, today prove to be overturned by the rate of historical changes. Against that background one sees in sharp relief the intransitory value of the ideological heritage of V. I. Lenin in the sphere of international relations, a heritage that is creatively developed by the party as applicable to new conditions.

Instructive in this sense are the historic fates of the Leninist concept of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. Guided by the Marxist demand for the concrete analysis of the concrete situation, V. I. Lenin was able, more than anyone else, to see not only the current tasks, but also the long-term tendencies, the needs for social development, as it were, anticipating the future. And therefore that concept, which was advanced during the first years of the Soviet authority, continues today, despite the cardinal changes that have occurred, to be a topical one, and not only as a principle of the foreign policy of the socialist state, but also as the only acceptable basis of international relations, which has been called upon to prevent the nuclear catastrophe that is threatening mankind.

The creative development of the Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence in the party's theoretical documents, and the enrichment of that concept in the course of foreign policy practice, is one of the brilliant examples of a new

way of thinking that corresponds to the realities of the nuclear age, and of the bold, constructive approach to the resolution of the most acute problem of modern times--the problem of war and peace.

Wherein lie the reasons for the vital force of the Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence? What are we taught by the historical experience of its application in practice? What are the conditions, content and prospects for the policy of peaceful coexistence in the last quarter of the 20th century? It is these and similar questions that have justifiably been ever present in the thoughts of our contemporaries. And one sees herein the striving not only to give tribute of respect to a brilliant thinker and revolutionary, but also to gain a deeper understanding of the burning problems of the struggle for peace and progress in our days, and to define the paths for resolving them.

1

The first thing that attracts one's attention when analyzing the sources of the Leninist concept of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems is the fact that its appearance is linked with a sharp crisis in the fates of mankind, the beginning of which was laid by the victory of the Great October [Socialist Revolution]. In international relations there arose a fundamentally new situation. For the first time in history the subject of those relations was a country in which the authority belonged not to the exploiter classes, but to the workers. Thus the basic class contradiction of the era--the contradiction between labor and capital, between the working class and the bourgeoisie--extended directly also to the sphere of international relations. Although the contradictions that divided the chief countries of capitalism and that led to World War I did not lose their acuity, the problems that continued to be in the center of world policy from that time on were the problems of the relations of states with opposing social systems. "The mutual relations of nations, the entire world system of states," V. I. Lenin said, "are determined by the struggle waged by a small group of imperialistic nations against the Soviet movement and the Soviet states, which are headed by Soviet Russia."¹

But whereas the rulers of the capitalist world responded to the new situation with the traditional means of imperialistic policy--armed intervention, economic blockade and a diplomatic boycott--for the purpose of erasing from the political map of the world the new "illegitimate" state with an alien social system, the answer that was proposed by V. I. Lenin was creative, truly innovative and, as we would say today, constructive.

The complexity of the tasks of the young Soviet regime in the field of foreign policy was influenced primarily by the qualitative change in the status of the working class, by its conversion into the dominant class and by the difficulty of making the transition, to use the words of G. V. Chicherin, "from the previous views of an underground revolutionary party to the political realism of a government that was in power." Moreover, the question of the foreign policy of the socialist state under the conditions of capitalist encirclement previously had not even been raised theoretically. As is well known, the great predecessors of V. I. Lenin--K. Marx and F. Engels--did not consider the

possibility of the victory of the proletarian revolution in a single country. But life took a different turn and, as was noted by V. I. Lenin, "from the very beginning of the October Revolution, the question of foreign policy and international relations confronted us as the most important question."²

Directly guiding the foreign policy of the country of Soviets, V. I. Lenin not only issued the summons to "search for new ways to resolve our international tasks,"³ but also provided brilliant examples of their resolution under the difficult conditions of the fierce class struggle, civil war, foreign military intervention, economic and diplomatic blockade and economic ruin.

In the sphere of foreign policy, where the socialist state was opposed by world imperialism--an experienced and strong opponent against which, as Lenin pointed out, it is not only necessary to fight, but also necessary to know how to fight⁴--factors which took on special importance in light of the Marxist requirement for a concrete analysis of the concrete situation were the consideration of the specifics of that sphere and the planning of strategy and tactics adequate to those specifics.

Relying upon a careful study of the real situation, ratio of forces and needs of social development, V. I. Lenin substantiated and proved, on the one hand, the inevitability of the simultaneous existence of states with different social systems in the course of the entire historical period, and, on the other hand, the desirability, from the standpoint of the interests of nations, and the real possibility, as he expressed it, of their "peaceful cohabitation."⁵

The Leninist theory of the socialist foreign policy took form, developed and became enriched in the course of the resolution of the practical tasks of Soviet diplomacy, in particular during the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (1918) and the Genoa Conference (1922). V. I. Lenin defended his views in the difficult struggle against the "leftist" Communists and Trotskiy, who did not want to consider the real correlation of forces and who did not understand the specifics of the foreign policy tasks of the proletariat that had been victorious in one country. The "leftists" in principle denied the possibility and desirability of any relations at all with the capitalist countries other than a "revolutionary war" and they advanced an idea that is alien to Marxism--the idea of "urging" a revolution in other countries. "We sat behind the table beside Hoffman, but not with Liebknecht, and, by so doing, we helped the German revolution,"⁶ V. I. Lenin explained, using the concrete example to clarify the dialectics of proletarian internationalism under the new historical conditions, the specifics of the foreign policy forms of the class struggle and the benefit of peaceful relations with the capitalist countries.

Speaking consistently in favor of peaceful coexistence and attempting to prove its desirability and objective possibility, V. I. Lenin, even after the end of the armed struggle that had been forced on the Soviet state, by no means considered it to be automatically guaranteed. He repeatedly warned of the danger of the violation of the peace and even the inevitability of new armed conflicts between socialism and capitalism, but he proceeded at such times

not from the opposition between the two systems, in and of itself, but from the aggressive, anti-Soviet strivings of imperialism, which socialism at that time, because of its relative weakness, was not yet able to bridle. But the reinforcement of the socialist state and the successes of its economic development increased the chances of establishing peaceful relations with the capitalist countries.

Working in the same direction were the antiwar moods of the workers, the mass support of the Soviet peace-loving policy both within the country and abroad, the taking into consideration of which is an important aspect in peaceful coexistence in V. I. Lenin's understanding.

"Our message," V. I. Lenin emphasized in the report on peace to the Second Congress of Soviets, "must be directed both to governments and to nations.... We must help nations to interfere in questions of war and peace."⁷

The Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence also presupposed the consideration of such realities as the contradictions in the capitalist camp--both those among the individual countries, and among the various groupings of the rightist circles of a particular country, including the representatives of the bourgeoisie "who are gravitating toward the military resolution of the question" and those "who are gravitating toward pacifism."⁸ Advancing the task of isolating the most reactionary, aggressive, interventionist elements, V. I. Lenin proceeded from the admissibility and desirability both of trade agreements and political agreements with the pacifistic wing of the bourgeoisie: "I do not see any reasons why such a socialist state as ours cannot have unlimited business relations with the capitalist countries."⁹

Viewing economic cooperation between the states in the two systems as a component part of the policy of peaceful coexistence, V. I. Lenin pointed out such an objective premise as "the general economic, worldwide relations" in which he saw a force that was greater than the "desire, will or decision of any of the hostile governments or classes."¹⁰ He taught Soviet diplomats how to combine compromises in the resolution of concrete problems with the advancement of broad long-term programs, particularly in the area of disarmament. Despite the resistance of the aggressive circles, the tendency toward the normalization of the economic and political relations between Soviet Russia and the main Western countries gradually carved itself a way, as was attested to, in particular, by the so-called "zone of recognitions" (1924-1925).

In the second half of the 1920's the chiefly economic ties between the USSR and the capitalist states began to be supplemented by the establishment of cooperation in the political area. That task took on special immediacy in the 1930's as a result of the formation of centers of military danger in the Far East and in Europe. However, the readiness of the USSR to engage in broad cooperation with the leading powers of Western Europe for purposes of guaranteeing collective security and giving a joint rebuff to the aggressors, and its concrete efforts in this direction, were undermined by the notorious Munich policy, which accelerated the unleashing of a world war by the fascist aggressors.

The aggressive war of Hitlerite Germany against the Soviet Union was objectively one of a series of attempts, but an attempt that was unprecedented in scope, on the part of the world's reactionary forces to resolve once and for all the historic controversy between the two systems by military means. As is well known, the attempt to reverse history failed ingloriously. Moreover, the results of the war were marked by a change in the placement and relationship of forces in the world, in favor of social progress and to the detriment of imperialistic reaction.

At the same time World War II brought new proof of the vital force of the concept of peaceful coexistence. The experience of the formation and activity of the anti-Hitler coalition, within the framework of which the states with opposing social systems cooperated successfully for the sake of victory over the common enemy, proved to be extremely instructive. That cooperation, naturally, was not cloudless and it encountered no small amount of resistance on the part of a definite group in the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain, the political credo of which was based exclusively on class hatred of socialism. However, the stern realities of the war and the sober consideration of the correlation of forces encouraged the leaders of the Western countries at that time to rise above primitive anti-Sovietism and to recognize the need to cooperate with the Soviet Union. The objective requirements of the situation were also well understood by the Soviet leaders, who consistently strove to consolidate the anti-Hitlerite coalition and all the healthy forces of mankind for purposes of the most rapid defeat of fascism.

Thus, even during that period when the capitalist world as a whole was still able to count on military superiority, the practical situation proved the possibility, correctness and fruitfulness of peaceful coexistence not only as a principle for socialist foreign policy, but also as the actual status for the relations between the Soviet state and the states of another socioeconomic system.

2

The world has changed to the point of unrecognizability since World War II. Fundamental shifts occurred in the placement and correlation of the forces on the international arena. There has been an expansion and reinforcement of the positions of world socialism. The economic, scientific, technical and defense potential of the Soviet Union has grown. A factor that has become an historic achievement of socialism was the establishment of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States, between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO, and that had decisive importance for the world situation as a whole. Something that became a substantial element in the new situation was the rise, on the fragments of the former colonial empires, of dozens of new countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and their striving to reinforce their independence and sovereignty. An increasingly noticeable influence on the development of international relations was exerted by the increase in the political awareness and participation rate of the masses of the people, and their antiwar moods. As an objective consequence of the deepening of the international division of labor and of the worldwide economic ties, and the appearance of new problems of a global scale that can be resolved only on the paths of

international cooperation, there has been an increase in the interrelationship and interdependence among countries, irrespective of the differences in their social systems.

All these circumstances substantially change the conditions and the prospects for relations between socialist and capitalist states and created more favorable prerequisites for their peaceful coexistence. The new situation brought about considerable changes in its context and place in the historic fate of mankind. The previous factors that influenced the possibility of the peaceful coexistence of the countries in the two systems were augmented by new ones, by virtue of which peaceful coexistence became a categorical imperative for the development of human society. That was linked primarily with the revolutionary changes in the sphere of military technology and with the increase in the threat of a nuclear war, the unleashing of which would not only mean the death of millions of people and the destruction of productive forces on an unprecedented scale, but would also raise the question of the very existence of entire countries and nations, the preservation of civilization and, possibly, life on earth itself. "Under present conditions," General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev asserted, "we are dealing not only with the confrontation between the two social systems, but also the choice between survival and mutual annihilation."¹¹

As a result, the interrelations between socialism and capitalism in the world arena are characterized at present by new features. In addition to the struggle and contradictions evolving from their social nature, one sees increasing signs of growing interdependence, which encourages cooperation between countries in both systems on the basis of common or coinciding interests, primarily in preventing a nuclear catastrophe and guaranteeing survival, and also in resolving certain other global and regional problems. Herein lies a very important political prerequisite for peaceful coexistence today among the states, irrespective of the differences in their social systems. Whereas in the past the acceptance or nonacceptance by the capitalist states of the idea of peaceful coexistence, which was consistently espoused by the USSR and its allies, depended primarily on the struggle and intertwinings of various situational and tactical interests of various groupings of the bourgeoisie, at the present time we are dealing with the long-term interests of all the countries, all social segments, including the bourgeoisie as a class, and with the interests of mankind as a whole as being a new category of world politics.

However, the practical implementation of the new favorable, objective prerequisites for peaceful coexistence will depend to a decisive degree upon a subjective factor--the ability of various social forces (class, parties, governments, political figures) to give a sober evaluation of the changed realities, or, to put it more precisely, the fundamentally new situation in international affairs, and, in conformity with that, to construct their foreign policy. The history of the postwar years has shown that, this time also, imperialism has proved to be unready to give a constructive response.

The hegemonistic strivings and imperial pretensions of American imperialism, which received their concrete expression in the extension of the arms race, in the attempts, with the aid of the atomic bomb, to achieve dominance in the

world, in the knocking together of military blocs, and in the lack of desire to consider the legal interests of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, influenced the intensification of tension in the relations among the states of the two systems, and the worsening of the general international situation. The cold war which was unleashed by the aggressive circles of the United States and which was accompanied in addition by local "hot" wars, left practically no place for peaceful coexistence. Although the cold war could not hinder the strengthening of the positions of socialism and other progressive forces, the cold war not only noticeably distorted international relations and poisoned the political atmosphere, but also hampered the resolution of the vitally important tasks that were confronting the people of all countries. For example, the adherence of the ruling circles of the Western countries to the traditional goals and methods of the imperialistic policy nullified the opportunities for the expansion of cooperation among countries of the two systems that had arisen as a result of the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition over the forces of fascism and as a result of the creation of the United Nations.

Although as one became increasingly aware of the insolvency of the cold war policy and the lack of prospects of the arms race and as the nuclear threat kept growing, the most farsighted representatives of the ruling circles of the West spoke out more and more frequently in favor of peaceful coexistence, the process of the re-examination and adaptation of foreign policy strategy to new realities in most of the capitalist nations occurred with rather long delays and has stretched out for many years. The foreign policy of the United States and its chief allies remains inconsistent and contradictory today.

On the one hand, it has pressing against it like a heavy load the lack of desire on the part of reactionary imperialist circles to be reconciled to the strengthening of forces for social progress, their adherence to power methods of combating the socialist states and the national liberation movement and their counting on the attainment of military superiority with the aid of a quantitative and qualitative arms race. Operating in the same direction are the material and political interests of the military-industrial complex. Other actions that run counter to the policy of peaceful coexistence are the actions that are directed at the "erosion" of the socialist community, the striving for social revenge and also the unusual inertia of the cold war in political thought.

On the other hand, ruling circles in the capitalist countries cannot ignore the fact that the realities of the nuclear age, the placement and correlation of forces in the world and the military-strategic equilibrium between the two systems influence not only the final insolvency of placing one's hopes on a worldwide thermonuclear war as a means of achieving whatever political purposes, but also the futility of a course aimed at confrontation. Hence the realistic tendency that presupposes the recognition in one form or another of the peaceful coexistence of the states of the two systems to be the only intelligent alternative to nuclear war.

The struggle between these tendencies in the political circles of the West influences the possibilities and limits of the practical implementation of the

principle of the peaceful coexistence of states in the two systems during a particular period, and the oscillations in the development of the international situation between detente and confrontation.

Another approach to the realities of the nuclear age has been demonstrated by the Soviet Union. Creatively developing Marxist-Leninist teaching, the CPSU has advanced and substantiated in its program documents a number of new principles with regard to questions of war and peace during the present era, including the thesis concerning the lack of the fatal inevitability of war and concerning peaceful coexistence as an objective necessity for the development of human society. The party's theoretical elaborations have been reinforced and rendered in concrete form in foreign policy practice. It was precisely the Soviet Union that came forward as the initiator of a decisive turn away from the cold war to detente, as the proponent of the normalization of international relations between the two systems on the basis of peaceful coexistence. The fraternal socialist countries also made statements from the same positions.

The implementation of the principle of peaceful coexistence in the practice of international relations, obviously, did not mean and could not mean the overcoming of the antagonism between the two systems, the complete resolution of the contradictions that divide them or the cessation of the class struggle in the international arena, particularly within the capitalist countries. However, the consistent conducting by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries of the course aimed at peaceful coexistence in combination with the assertion of realistic tendencies in the policy of the main Western countries was marked in the late 1960's and early 1970's by a turn toward detente, by the reinforcement of international security and by the expansion of cooperation between the countries of the two systems, primarily in Europe.

The principle of peaceful coexistence received, more so than ever before, its broad and concrete implementation in the practice of relations between the Soviet Union and the main countries of Western Europe. Within comparatively short periods of time, a resolution was found for many disputed problems which had poisoned the international atmosphere and which had, quite recently, seemed to be unresolvable; a large number of specific treaties, agreements and understandings were developed; the political dialogue between East and West, including dialogue on the summit level, has become a beneficial mechanism in the development of mutual relations in many areas.

The implementation, in the practice of international relations, of the principles of peaceful coexistence was accompanied by the expansion in the 1970's of economic ties between the Soviet Union and the Western states. It was precisely during that decade that one observed the intensive development of their scientific, technical and industrial cooperation and the commodity turnover between them increased from 4.7 billion rubles to 31.6 billion.¹²

The United States did not remain aloof from this general tendency. The turn toward Soviet-American relations received its expression in the document that was signed in 1972, entitled "Principles of Interrelations Between the USSR and the United States," in which there was an expression of the consent of

both contracting parties "to proceed from the general conviction that, during the nuclear age, there is no basis for the maintenance of relations between them other than peaceful coexistence." The first concrete results in the SALT negotiations were also achieved.

The policy of peaceful coexistence and the mutually advantageous cooperation between the states in the two systems proved to be applicable and effective also at the multilateral level, convincing confirmation of which was provided by the work and results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. On the basis of the recognition of the territorial and political realities that had occurred in Europe as a result of World War II and the postwar development, the 35 states participating in that unprecedented forum collectively confirmed the inviolability of existing borders; developed a code of principles governing international relations, which correspond to the requirements of peaceful coexistence; and set down the prospects for cooperation among European states in various areas. The Final Act adopted in Helsinki is an example of intelligent compromise, reflecting the well-weighed balancing of the interests of its participants. The principles of international relations which were developed in Helsinki received consolidation in the USSR Constitution.

It is indicative that during the decades of postwar development the idea of peaceful coexistence received broader and broader recognition and its principles, in one way or another, were put into concrete form in the documents of the United Nations and the nonaligned movement, in the decisions of international forums and in the foreign policy declarations of various countries.

As a whole, the practice of international relations, especially during the 1970's, confirmed the vital force of the policy of peaceful coexistence and its very promising capabilities if carried out consistently by both sides. With consideration for historical experience, the CPSU formulated its understanding of the policy of peaceful coexistence, a policy which presupposes: rejection of war and the application of force or threats of force as a means of resolving disputes, but instead the resolution of disputes by means of negotiations; non-interference in internal affairs and the consideration of one another's legal interests; the right of nations to control their own fate independently; the strict respect of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders; cooperation on the basis of completely equal rights and mutual advantage; the conscientious execution of pledges stemming from the generally accepted principles and standards of international law and from the international treaties that have been concluded.

3

Excellent models of political thought corresponding to the realities of life, of the creative enrichment of the concept of peaceful coexistence and of the bold, Leninist, innovative and constructive approach to the resolution of foreign policy problems in a situation that has become noticeably complicated have been demonstrated by the CPSU at the modern, largely critical stage in world development.

In the policy of the leading Western power--the United States of America--there has been an intensification of the aggressive tendencies. The unprecedented growth of military expenditures and the adoption of long-term programs for the production of new types and systems of weapons, the creation of the rapid deployment force and the stronger emphasis on interventionist actions in various parts of the world, strategic intentions that proceed from the admission of "limited nuclear war" and the first nuclear strike and, finally, the "Star Wars" plans--those are the basic manifestations of Washington's militaristic course, a course it is attempting to force on its NATO allies.

Recent events indicate that U.S. reactionary circles, which are hostile to socialism, are inclined to view the problems of war and peace, of the bridling of the arms race and of peaceful coexistence, problems which are of global importance and truly affect mankind as a whole, through the prism of their own selfish considerations. This is attested to, in particular, by the concepts preached by Washington, concepts of the type of "new globalism," "coordination" and so forth, which make the negotiations on the burning problems of the cessation of the arms race on earth and the prevention of it in space dependent upon conduct by the USSR which is pleasing to the United States in various conflicts of a regional nature, and even in matters lying exclusively within the sphere of Soviet domestic policy.

All of this could not fail to lead to the sharp worsening of not only Soviet-American relations, but also the international climate as a whole, and to the increasing danger of nuclear war. The prospect of a new increase in the quantitative and qualitative arms race is fraught with the undermining of strategic stability and puts mankind directly under the threat of self-annihilation.

During this critical time, now that the development of world events has approached a fatal stage and especially responsible decisions are needed, and now that inaction or delay in taking action would be criminal, the leadership of the Soviet Union has undertaken a number of major, fundamental foreign policy actions to overcome the negative confrontational tendencies of recent years. A concrete expression of Leninist foreign policy at the present stage was provided by the foreign policy principles enunciated at the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the subsequent large-scale initiatives of the USSR and the documents of the 27th CPSU Congress. As M. S. Gorbachev noted in reference to new developments in the sphere of international security, particularly in Europe, we "have begun a process of rethinking, of putting into complete conformity with new realities many of the customary ideas, including those in the military and, of course, the political areas."¹³

The prompt awareness of the realities of the nuclear age, the declaration of the absolute priority of efforts to prevent a nuclear war and curb the arms race, and the question of guaranteeing common security in a number of other foreign policy tasks and the need to re-examine obsolete ideas concerning the developmental patterns and methods of international relations and the refusal to rely on military strength constitute the intransitory pledge of our party.

In our day one sees in an increasingly graphic manner the manifestation of the humanitarian purpose, expanding social parameters and constructive nature of

the Leninist course aimed at peaceful coexistence. Its consistent pursuit corresponds not only to the class and state interests of the Soviet people and their allies, but also to the vital needs of other nations and to the interests of mankind as a whole. "We are realists," M. S. Gorbachev said at the 27th CPSU Congress, "and we are completely aware that there is very much that divides the two world, and it divides them deeply. But we also see something else clearly: the need to resolve the most vital tasks pertaining to mankind as a whole but encourage them to engage in interaction, must arouse unprecedented efforts to assure the self-preservation of mankind."¹⁴

Now that the course of social progress persistently demands the establishment of constructive and creative interaction by states and nations on the world-wide scale, the CPSU, as the new edition of the party program states, will purposefully promote the complete assertion of the principle of peaceful coexistence as the norm in international relations, a norm accepted and observed by everyone. In the principles enunciated in the program and in other party documents there is a reflection of the substantial expansion and deepening of the content of the concept of peaceful coexistence in our time. In particular, they emphasize that, in a world filled with acute conflicts, a world facing the threat of catastrophe, the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems is the only intelligent, the only acceptable alternative. In light of today's realities, one factor of special importance is the view of peaceful coexistence as one of the highest universal laws of international relations and as the only way to attain international security and guarantee the survival of mankind.

In the struggle for these goals, the Soviet Union is ready for interaction with everyone taking a position of intelligence, goodwill and the recognition of responsibility for the preservation of peace on the planet, for a future without wars and without weapons. And it is no coincidence that it is precisely from Moscow that a warm and thoroughly substantiated appeal is being issued to the entire world "to rise above national egotism, tactical calculations, arguments and dissension, all of which are insignificant in comparison to the preservation of the chief value--peace and a safe future."¹⁵

The present-day, richer and deeper content of the policy of peaceful coexistence is also influenced by the fact that the central problem in the relations between states of the two systems, primarily between the USSR and United States, is the problem of security. The guaranteeing of security rises increasingly, as was emphasized at the 27th CPSU Congress, as a political task. And its genuine resolution cannot be found on the paths of confrontation, or the use of pressure with the threat of military force, or of the arms race. It requires the joint efforts of both sides on the basis of equality and identical security, since the lesser security of one of the sides increases the suspiciousness of the other side, and the instability of the general situation. This presupposes the need to proceed, as M. S. Gorbachev said, toward a "joint understanding of what level of armaments on each side can be considered relatively sufficient from the standpoint of reliable defense."¹⁶ Progress in the resolution of this central problem in Soviet-American relations will make possible the consistent strengthening of mutual trust, the development of political dialogue and the fruitful discussion of economic and

humanitarian matters and the issues of contacts and reciprocal exchanges of information.

The Soviet Union feels that in our time, in international relations between the two systems, there is no fatal inevitability of war or confrontation, and it feels that peaceful coexistence is not simply the absence of war, but, as the new edition of the CPSU Program states, the international order in which good-neighbor relations and cooperation prevail and there is the broad exchange of scientific and technical achievements and cultural values for the good of all mankind.¹⁷ The completely equal and mutually advantageous cooperation among states, irrespective of their social systems, represents a component part of constructive coexistence, a necessary condition both for the progress of civilization and for mutual survival.

An inseparable component of relations between countries is the establishment of trust. The CPSU--and this is also emphasized in the program--proceeds from the inadmissibility of extending ideological contradictions to the sphere of international relations. The overcoming of inertia in thought processes, the elimination of mutual suspicions, distrust and the prejudices that have accumulated over the decades, learning how to live together and to get along with one another on this small planet, by mastering the difficult art of taking one another's interests into consideration--these are the actions M. S. Gorbachev persistently appeals for. "That is what we call the policy of peaceful coexistence," he said.¹⁸

Continuing the Leninist tradition, the CPSU sees the tremendous reserves and capabilities of the policy of peaceful coexistence in the mass movements that express, as it were, mankind's instinct for self-preservation, and also in the fact that there is not a single nation that wants war. The antiwar demonstrations of the masses have been a long-term and influential factor in world politics. A part of the peace potential that opposes the aggressive plans of imperialism is also represented by the policy of the overwhelming majority of states in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which are vitally interested in the preservation of peace and the cessation of the arms race. On the asset side of the ledger in the policy of peaceful coexistence, one must also enter the position taken by many realistic statesmen and politicians in the capitalist world who understand the danger of continuing and expanding the arms race and who advocate a return to detente. Because the "watershed" between the adherents and opponents of peaceful coexistence by no means coincides always with the line of social or class delimitation. In the struggle for a world without wars and without weapons, the objective ally of socialism is mankind as a whole.

"Today it is more important than ever before," M. S. Gorbachev emphasized in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress, "to find the paths for closer and more productive cooperation with governments, parties, public organizations and movements which are actually concerned about the fate of peace on earth, and with all nations for the sake of creating an all-encompassing system of international security."¹⁹ The principles for that system were set forth at the congress, as well as the program that was addressed to the entire world--the concrete program computed for a precisely

defined period of time, the program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within the next 15 years--in addition to other large-scale Soviet initiatives of recent years in which one sees the practical embodiment of the new party principles that correspond to current realities, are encountering the unanimous approval and support of the Soviet people, the people of the countries of the socialist community and all people of goodwill.

The might of the Soviet Union and its allies, their firm and consistent policy of peaceful coexistence by states with different social systems, and their readiness to cooperate with all sensible and peaceful forces, emerge more and more clearly as one of the important guarantees of the preservation of world peace, as one of the chief hindrances on the path of those who are pushing mankind toward nuclear catastrophe. The policy of peaceful coexistence will yield its most tangible fruits, as past experience testifies, when both sides adhere to it consistently. Departure from the policy by one country or another--and this too is attested to by historical experience--harms not only that country, but also, in the final analysis, all members of the international community and the cause of peace and progress in general.

In our time, now that the threat of thermonuclear war is hanging over mankind like a sword of Damocles, all countries must face the choice between survival and universal annihilation. The policy of peaceful coexistence means a choice in favor of life, in favor of progress and a bright future for mankind. That path was bequeathed to us by the great Lenin, and the determination of the Soviet Union to proceed firmly along that path has received new and convincing confirmation at the 27th CPSU Congress.

In its resolution, the 27th CPSU Congress oriented "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union toward strict adherence to the course of peaceful coexistence, toward firmness in defending our principles and positions, toward tactical flexibility, toward readiness for mutually acceptable compromises and toward dialogue and mutual understanding."²⁰

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, p 242.
2. Ibid., vol 37, p 153.
3. Ibid., vol 40, p 67.
4. Ibid., vol 35, p 396.
5. Ibid., vol 40, p 145.
6. Ibid., vol 36, pp 19-20.
7. Ibid., vol 35, p 16.
8. Ibid., vol 45, p 70.

9. Ibid., vol 40, p 152.
10. Ibid., vol 44, pp 304-305.
11. PRAVDA, 22 November 1985.
12. "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1983 g." [The USSR National Economy in 1983], Statistical Yearbook, Moscow, 1984, p 560.
13. PRAVDA, 4 October 1985.
14. M. S. Gorbachev, "Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th CPSU Congress," Moscow, 1986, p 25.
15. PRAVDA, 16 January 1986.
16. Ibid., 28 November 1985.
17. Ibid., 26 October 1985.
18. Ibid., 4 October 1985.
19. M. S. Gorbachev, Op. cit., p 95.
20. PRAVDA, 6 March 1986.

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EVIDENCE OF CRISIS IN NATO VIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 86 (signed to press 19 Mar 86) pp 14-22

[Article by S. A. Ulin: "Signs of Crisis in NATO"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The NATO bloc has undergone several convulsions in its lifetime. Recently, however, conflicts have acquired a distinctive, deeper basis: Under the conditions of parity on the global level, the allies are expressing doubts about the American leadership. Former Secretary of State A. Haig writes in his memoirs: "For three decades the Western Europeans' suspicion that the United States considered Europe's life to be cheaper than its own was restrained by the fact of American nuclear superiority. But when this superiority disappeared, the apprehensions of the West Europeans became more pronounced."¹

American ruling circles and Republican Party experts frankly acknowledge the presence of serious problems undermining the solidarity of the West in general and intra-NATO cooperation in particular. One of these problems is the growing opposition of Western Europeans to the bloc's military strategy. The official doctrine of the North Atlantic alliance, the doctrine of "flexible response," envisages the use of nuclear weapons during the initial stage of a conflict in Europe. This kind of suicidal planning, presupposing the extinction of millions of the continent's inhabitants within the first few days of an armed conflict, cannot seem reasonable to the Europeans. Furthermore, Pentagon minds cannot offer any other prospect, and the absence of a doctrinal basis satisfying the majority of West Europeans and Americans is creating constant psychological tension which cannot be dispelled by the falsely optimistic communiqués of NATO meetings.

Another problem arose in connection with the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe. Washington is known to assume the possibility of a "limited" nuclear conflict in Europe. On 16 October 1981, for example, President R. Reagan announced that he could "imagine an exchange of tactical nuclear strikes against troops using conventional weapons in a theater of military operations without either of the great powers pushing the strategic button."² For this reason, many West Europeans regard the deployment of the missiles as further evidence of the Pentagon's intention to "limit" the nuclear war to Europe; the arguments that these missiles will supposedly link

the United States to Western Europe seem far-fetched and unconvincing to them.

Another problem concerns East-West relations. The deliberate belligerence of the Republican administration has given it the reputation of an impetuous administration, willing to take hasty and often reckless actions and jeopardize the lives of millions of people for the sake of shows of strength and determination. Rightwing Americans, on the other hand, speak with unconcealed arrogance about many of the prevailing ideas, traditions and beliefs in Western Europe as naive concepts born of pacifism and the notorious policy of appeasement. The political philosophy of Reaganism is quite far removed from the stand taken on contemporary international issues by social democrats and other forces in Western Europe with intense and positive experience in contacts with the socialist countries. The result is a substantial gap between the ideas, the beliefs and, in the final analysis, the interests of the two halves of NATO.

Some conflicts have also arisen in connection with differing approaches to the two-thirds of mankind living in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In the 1980's the United States took a position of unyielding contempt for the needs of the developing countries and a forceful approach to states choosing a pattern of social development unacceptable to the American administration. The West European countries, on the other hand, are seeking ways of strengthening ties with them and are criticizing the inflexibility of the American position in such regions as the Middle East, Central America and southern Africa.

A new reason for disagreements within NATO was Washington's so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI)--the plan to develop and create an antimissile system with space-based elements. The West Europeans immediately expressed several doubts about this initiative: Would the SDI not destabilize the strategic situation and not lead to a new colossal round of the arms race?

There is no question that all of these factors will have a perceptible effect on the North Atlantic alliance in the 1980's and there is consequently good reason to examine them in greater detail.

DEBATES ON NATO DOCTRINE. Although the bloc's strategic theory, the doctrine of "flexible response," was adopted in 1968 (it took the Americans 6 years to impose it on their allies), the problems of synchronizing joint actions, of distributing military efforts more or less equitably and, mainly, of the time, method and conditions of using nuclear weapons have invariably been central topics of discussion at all NATO forums. The definitions of bloc behavior in times of crisis are extremely vague. They state in general terms that the ladder of escalation must be climbed gradually, moving from a local conflict through intermediate stages to an exchange of strikes by U.S. and USSR central strategic systems.

When the doctrine was formulated in 1962, however, the world was a different place: The strategic superiority of the United States was tangible. In the European theater it had 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons and medium-range missiles in England, Turkey and Italy, and at that time the USSR had no equivalent to this. Over 20 years the situation changed: Under the conditions of

strategic parity and approximate equality in intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, the new strategic situation necessitated the reassessment of doctrinal premises. It is interesting that the first to begin revising the doctrine of "flexible response" was its author, R. McNamara. He and three other renowned experts on politico-military strategy (M. Bundy, G. Kennan and G. Smith) began NATO-wide discussions of ways of modifying this doctrine in accordance with the spirit of the times.

In their article "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,"³ they concluded that the change in the strategic situation and the way in which this change was perceived by Americans and West Europeans lay at the basis of the crisis of NATO nuclear strategy. In the past, the American leadership had reinforced its determination to use nuclear weapons first with concrete military planning, whereas the West Europeans, knowing that the use of American nuclear weapons would signify retaliation against the United States, believed that this prospect dictated cautious behavior in matters connected with the use of nuclear weapons.

In the 1980's, however, the United States began to rely heavily on the dramatic buildup of its nuclear potential in Western Europe, as a result of which political circles there began to realize that the United States found the following scenario more and more appealing: to start and stop the nuclear exchange in the European theater of military operations. The Pentagon's intention to use nuclear weapons first poses a lethal threat to Western Europe. It is indicative that R. McNamara and his colleagues share the apprehensions of the West Europeans.

Realizing the urgent need to revise bloc doctrine, the four American experts advised their government to renounce its publicly declared intention to use nuclear weapons first. Their opinions had widespread public repercussions. Many authorities on both sides of the Atlantic favored the modernization of NATO strategy. The Americans included H. Kissinger, M. Taylor, M. Howard and N. Gaylor. The West Europeans advocating an updated strategy for the North Atlantic bloc were K. Bertram and Lord Culver (Great Britain), F. de Rose (France), T. Sommer (FRG) and several others.

The advocates of the revision of the NATO strategy based on the bloc's first use of nuclear weapons believe that this revision could "neutralize the highly destructive argument put forth in (Western) Europe: The plans for the modernization of theater nuclear weapons reflect the American hope of fighting a nuclear war confined to Europe."⁴

An attempt was made to repulse the "revisionists'" attack by such pillars of NATO as General D. Jones, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General B. Rogers, commander of NATO forces in Europe. The heated debates are still going on, although the previous doctrine--now almost 20 years old--is officially still in effect.

DID THE AMERICAN INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES STRENGTHEN NATO? Semi-official NATO spokesmen have asserted in all languages that they have strengthened it. Under the cover of official satisfaction, however, the destructive effects of the operation of saturating Europe with American intermediate-range missiles

on NATO's solidarity and unity can be seen. The political costs turned out to be exceptionally high for NATO. First of all, one of the five countries earmarked as a deployment site, Holland, refused at first to allow American missiles on its territory (it agreed 2 years later). Secondly, almost all large opposition parties in the countries agreeing to the deployment of the missiles opposed this action. Thirdly, the protests against NATO policy moved out of offices to the streets and squares of Western Europe; mass public protest has become an important factor in Western politics. The Reagan Administration's policy line revealed all of the unsightly details of its Americanocentrism and its contempt for the wishes of millions of West Europeans. This is a good lesson in political vigilance and it will be influencing relations between bloc allies in the future.

Many Western experts who assess the significance of the deployment of American missiles in Western Europe try to put a good face on the matter. An increasing number frankly admit (for instance, Director S. Hoffmann of the Harvard University Center for European Studies) that decisions like this "are dictated too often by the prevailing circumstances of the moment and by short-term considerations." He wrote: "The United States tried to demonstrate firmness in pursuing its line to avoid repetitions of the failure of the plans for the deployment of neutron weapons in Europe."⁵ The Harvard expert believes that political problems cannot be solved by technical means, that the diverging interests of NATO countries cannot be neutralized by the deployment of missiles in Europe and that the American administration must "use American means to conduct a strategy corresponding to the present day, and not to the world of the 1950's."⁶

In general, it can be said that the deployment of the American intermediate-range missiles gave rise to an antiwar movement in the United States, and especially in Western Europe, of such force that a new sociopolitical climate has been created. In essence, this movement is aimed against NATO and testifies that the bloc is losing its social base of support.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS. Increasing numbers of people in the United States and in Western Europe are taking a skeptical view of the myth of the "threat from the East." Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense M. Halperin, for example, remarked that "it is difficult in retrospect to name a time when the Soviets came close to using military strength against any of the countries of the alliance."⁷

The interrelations between Eastern and Western Europe have now acquired independent value and the Reagan Administration's crude attempts to "attach" Western Europe to the "cold war" chariot have been resolutely repulsed. This has included the positive change in the SPD policy line, the rise of the Green Party in the FRG and the English Labor Party's statements in favor of complete and universal nuclear disarmament. The ruling elite in Western Europe, once fairly unanimous in matters of foreign policy, did not automatically follow the lead of the instigators of the new "cold war." The West Europeans in general were happy with the detente of the 1970's and see the normalization of relations with the East as a guarantee of peaceful development. Diverging views of the future are creating tension in the North Atlantic alliance.

"The West Europeans are disturbed by the American nostalgia for the 1950's, the era of American nuclear superiority, a relatively calm Third World and indisputable American leadership in the military alliance," S. Hoffmann wrote back in fall 1981.⁸

"The most debatable issues in relations between Western Europe and America," an editorial in London's FINANCIAL TIMES commented, "are East-West relations, expenditures on defense (Americans feel that the Europeans are doing too little in this area), arms control (according to the Europeans, the Americans are doing too little in this area) and NATO nuclear strategy (in their opinion, the Americans are talking too much about this)."⁹

R. Reagan's belligerent rhetoric also irritated the Europeans. His statements "about limited nuclear war in Europe, about the duty of Christians to wipe the evil of communism off the face of the earth and about the need for a 'crusade' against the East sent cold chills down European spines," a NEWSWEEK correspondent remarked.¹⁰ Italy's PANORAMA cited remarks by Western diplomats: "The possibility of a rift between the United States and some European allies exists. The relationship of confidence has been undermined."¹¹

American diplomacy encountered certain difficulties on the southern flank of NATO (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey--S. U.). Greece is voicing its disagreement with bloc policy louder and louder, openly and almost officially censuring Reagan's line in East-West relations. The unconcealed blackmail of the "Atlanticists" and the Reagan Administration's promise to support Spain in the talks with London on the Gibraltar issue helped to involve the country in the NATO system, but Madrid has refused to join the bloc's military organization and does not exclude the possibility of eventual withdrawal from the North Atlantic alliance. The mass protests of the Spanish public against the Pentagon plans, divulged in February 1985, to transfer nuclear weapons to Spanish territory in the event of a crisis complicated the problem of Spain's membership in NATO even more.

People in the United States admit that the situation in the countries of NATO's southern flank in general is close to critical. This was discussed in the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives during 1985 hearings on military assistance to the countries of the southern flank.¹²

POLICY IN RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. The West Europeans are worried about the United States' aggressive policy in Asia, Africa and Latin America and Washington's attempts to include vast regions of the "Third World" in NATO's "zone of responsibility." Some experts view this merely as a reordering of priorities. Researcher M. Clair from the Washington Institute for Policy Studies, for example, feels that Reagan's "reordering of priorities assigned primary significance to the role of world policeman, which is more important to the United States now than its commitments to Europe."¹³ In the West European capitals, however, people are well aware that this is actually a matter of Washington's attempts to involve its allies in military ventures in the "Third World" and are reluctant to meet the United States half-way.

With a view to the region's comparatively greater dependence on raw materials from developing countries, the West European members of NATO have acquired a number of "associates" among the young states on the basis of the Lome agreements¹⁴ and are primarily concerned about the stability of economic ties with them.

For this reason, the U.S. adventuristic line did not win the support Washington anticipated in Western Europe. While the United States was working toward the overthrow of the legitimate government of Nicaragua, the West European countries, such as France (in conjunction with Mexico), put forth initiatives to settle the conflict in Central America and supported the Contadora group's efforts to alleviate tension in the region.

Disagreements between allies have been compounded by U.S. policy in Central America. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, "the increased friction between the Reagan Administration and the West European governments over U.S. policy in Central America could seriously weaken the North Atlantic Treaty Organization...and could shake the unity of NATO."¹⁵ Spanish Foreign Minister Moran warned that direct American intervention in Central America would motivate Spain to withdraw from the alliance. Even Pentagon chief C. Weinberger had to admit that the situation in Central America had caused friction in NATO.

Another arena of American interventionism is north Africa and the Middle East. The United States set itself in opposition to virtually all the West European allies by concluding the agreement on "strategic cooperation" with Israel, which evoked a wave of indignation in the Arab countries (it is no secret that oil from this region is an important raw material for Western Europe). A comparison of the EEC Venice declaration (1980), discussing the rights of the Palestinian Arabs and the need for an all-encompassing settlement of the conflict in the Middle East, to Reagan's diplomacy of separate agreements in the spirit of Camp David testifies that the interests of the two halves of NATO are in conflict and are logically developing in opposite directions.

The Reagan Administration has seriously aggravated relations with Libya. Announcing that this country's policy allegedly poses a "threat to the national security of the United States," the White House imposed a ban on economic and trade relations with Libya in January and froze all Libyan assets in the United States. It followed this by ordering American citizens working in Libya to leave the country. A task force of military ships was sent to its shores, effectively signalling preparations for aggression. The United States' West European NATO partners are known to have dissociated themselves completely from Washington's actions and to have enraged the White House by doing so.

NATO AND 'STAR WARS.' One indicator of trouble in the bloc was the reaction of its West European members to President Reagan's so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative," the implementation of which would extend the arms race to outer space.

Official NATO organs hastened to express support for it. Lord Carrington, the secretary general of the alliance, said in a West German radio broadcast that "the Americans have the right to conduct research in this field."¹⁶

To give the West Europeans incentive and to win their support, the American side decided to involve its allies in the implementation of the SDI even during the stage of research. At the end of March 1985, C. Weinberger distributed a letter to the defense ministers of bloc countries who had gathered in Luxembourg at a session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. The letter asked them to report on possible fields of joint research in 2 months.

The Pentagon's representative in Luxembourg, J. Cooper, explained that these countries were given such a short period of time (60 days) to consider the matter in "the hope of intensifying the implementation of a broad program of research and development to the maximum."¹⁷

It must be said that the SDI issue gave rise to internal struggles in all of the West European countries. Military monopolies and related groups in the government quickly responded to the American initiative with counterproposals. The report prepared by the FRG Defense Ministry for government planning experts listed five major fields of possible participation by West German industry in the "Star Wars" program. The English took a similar position. Representatives of Great Britain's Defense Department reached an agreement with the Pentagon on participation by English researchers and companies in a number of projects connected with the "Star Wars" program.

Many West European responses, however, seriously disturbed the Reagan Administration. At the end of March 1985, for example, the first meeting of the socialist parties of the European NATO countries was held in Lisbon and the SDI was one of the topics of discussion. All 12 delegations attending the meeting opposed the militarization of space. They unanimously concluded that the "European nucleus" of NATO must be strengthened, and SPD expert E. Barr questioned the validity of even initial research related to the militarization of outer space. The existence of specific West European interests in the sphere of security and the development of East-West cooperation, diverging from Washington's strategy, was underscored in the speeches of many delegates.

Only the governments of England and the FRG agreed to participate in SDI-related R & D projects. France, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Greece and some other Western countries do not support the SDI on the official level, although they have not prohibited participation in these projects by their companies.

The SDI gave rise to fairly unexpected conflicts between the United States and the West European NATO members. Minister of Defense Woerner of the FRG stated that the West European allies expect the "unlimited transmission of technical data in an atmosphere of trust" across the Atlantic Ocean as the work on the research projects progresses. This was so contrary to the position of the Americans that they could not even remain silent. At the NATO Council session in summer 1985 they explained that things would be "slightly different." C. Weinberger had to admit that European officials had voiced certain stipulations with regard to the SDI research program, essentially signifying that they would take care of themselves if the United States should "successfully deploy an antimissile shield over its territory."¹⁸ Now Washington strategists are striving to include a statement in the agreements with NATO allies on participation in the "Star Wars" program about the creation of the so-called

European part of the "star defense system." This, in their opinion, should convince the West Europeans that they will be covered by the notorious space shield.

The actual work on the research plans, however, is pointing up what has worried the United States' NATO allies from the very beginning: Washington will not keep its promise to share the technical achievements of the space age with them.

There is the increasing fear in Western Europe that Washington's attempts to advance the "Star Wars" program at any cost will lead to the even more pronounced escalation of international tension. Influential political forces in the NATO countries want the favorable opportunities created by Soviet peaceful initiatives to be used to improve the climate in the world and limit militarist preparations.

Therefore, the North Atlantic alliance entered a new phase in its development in the middle of the 1980's. The United States is seeking a more stable basis of its relations with bloc allies. Quantitative changes are evolving into qualitative changes, and this evolution began in the 1980's. "The disappearance of American nuclear superiority and the accumulation of economic problems in the 1970's put a heavy burden on Atlantic accord.... Unwise rhetoric in Washington accelerated the progression of opposition forces, especially the Labor Party in England and the Social Democrats in the FRG, in anti-American directions," A. Haig acknowledged.¹⁹

The American supreme allied commanders of NATO forces in Europe have usually been more concerned with military routine and have left the discussion of bloc development to theorists. General B. Rogers, however, became one of the bloc's prominent theorists in the 1980's. In an unprecedented number of reports, statements and interviews, he has voiced simple and complex versions of the same theory: The contingent of NATO conventional forces must be increased to provide a variety of options in the event of a conflict. The "Rogers Plan" became an expression of the American military's demand that the West European allies be forced to increase their contribution to NATO by supplying it with more human material. General Rogers has enthusiastically used the argument that there must be an interval between conventional and nuclear wars and that this interval can only be secured by a larger NATO army and a better conventional (non-nuclear) arsenal.²⁰ He hopes to alleviate the severity of internally arguments about nuclear strategy, the dominant role of the United States and the dangerous nature of the American policy line by enlarging the contingents of conventional troops. These solutions to fundamental problems in military planning have not produced the desired results to date, but B. Rogers is still actively defending his theory.

The idea of increasing the non-nuclear component of NATO arms has been supported by several research centers in the West, such as the Aspen Institute. In its report, "Managing East-West Conflict," signed by many former cabinet members and experts, the more extensive use of the latest equipment is advised: "Frontline defense must and, in our opinion, can be secured by improving the capabilities of conventional weapons."²¹ The authors do not go as far as

R. McNamara and his colleagues, who have advised (as mentioned above) a refusal to use nuclear weapons first, but they do suggest the reduction of the North Atlantic alliance's emphasis on nuclear weapons: "We feel it is important to reduce the West's dependence on nuclear weapons in Europe. For this reason, we recommend that the Atlantic alliance move toward the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons in the early stage."²²

This appeal, therefore, is not for the complete renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons, but for the renunciation of their use during the early stage of a conflict. Furthermore, one of the aims of this proposal to lengthen the "interval" between conventional and nuclear stages is the cessation of friction within the West over this matter.

Considerable interest has been aroused in the West by the proposals on the modernization of NATO structures and strategy recently put forth by H. Kissinger, who believes that "the continuation of current trends will unavoidably demoralize the Western alliance."²³ The former secretary of state has proposed the assignment of a more important role in NATO to the West European countries, the reform of the internal organization of the alliance and the reassessment of the current distribution of power within NATO.

The first of these points presupposes the stimulation of the military integration of West European countries (Kissinger advises Americans not to fear this prospect). As for the proposal of structural reform, it is supposed to aid in defining NATO's political goals. Western Europe is to be made responsible for the bloc's conventional armed forces and for the planning of the West European military system by 1990. The position of supreme allied commander in Europe should be occupied by a West European, but the position of NATO secretary general, responsible for policymaking, should be given, in Kissinger's opinion, to an American. The West Europeans should take the initiative in talks with the USSR on intermediate-range missiles and the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of arms and armed forces in central Europe. The third proposal is intended to accomplish a sort of "division of labor": Western Europe will be responsible for conventional weapons and the United States will be responsible for strategic ones. "The structure I propose," the author writes, "will allow West Europeans to answer the questions that have remained unanswered for at least two decades: the exact definition of the necessary conventional (non-nuclear) defense; the nature of the so-called nuclear threshold; the relationship between strategy and arms control."²⁴

In this way, for the sake of "peace in NATO," H. Kissinger suggests that Western Europe be encouraged to conduct a massive buildup of conventional weapons.

Will the encouragement of more intense military efforts by West European allies aid in resolving intra-NATO conflicts? Are the authors of these plans constructing new illusions, based on the assumption that a stronger Western Europe would supposedly be a more loyal ally? At this time, there is only a clear desire to use any means to surmount intense disagreement and misunderstandings.

In a world filled with weapons, where many regional conflicts take place, the suggestion that problems between allies can be solved by more extensive military programs appears at the very least to be a sign of dangerous nearsightedness.

As a statement by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev says, "it is time to put an end to this course of events and cut the Gordian knot. The Soviet Union has been proposing the removal of nuclear weapons, both intermediate-range and tactical, from Europe for a long time. This proposal is still in force."²⁵

FOOTNOTES

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U.S.-JAPANESE ECONOMIC CONTRADICTIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 86 (signed to press 19 Mar 86) pp 25-34

[Article by A. B. Parkanskiy: "Exacerbation of American-Japanese Economic Conflicts"]

[Text] Trade and economic contacts are an important part of U.S. relations with Japan, strongly influencing the entire group of these relations and the economies of the two states. Conflicts in this area are now so severe that they are numbered among the central issues of U.S. foreign and domestic policy.

The "Japanese offensive" has become a cardinal theme of the mass media, statements by politicians and bourgeois scientific research in the United States. This campaign has insistently implied that the current trends in economic rivalry with Japan could pose a threat to U.S. strategic interests. If the United States allows itself to fall behind Japan in economics, science and technology, American bourgeois researchers assert, this will undermine the existing structure of the U.S. economy, cause American corporations to lose huge markets and sources of raw materials abroad and weaken the position of the dollar, which will eventually destroy the economic basis of U.S. politico-military leadership in the capitalist world and bring about a fundamental change in the balance of power between imperialist competitors. These processes will be accompanied, in the opinion of some authors, by profound socioeconomic changes within the United States: the redistribution of economic and political strength among different segments of the bourgeoisie by weakening those crushed by Japanese competition, the deterioration of economic conditions, the escalation of inflation and unemployment, the decline of major industrial centers and the overall exacerbation of the sociopolitical situation.¹

These tendencies could weaken the politico-military alliance of the two states. The final report of the American-Japanese consultative commission created in 1983 by President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone frankly states that economic competition between the two countries could motivate Japan to take a "more central foreign policy position" in the future, leading to "unfavorable events" in American-Japanese relations.² The United States might not only lose military bases in Japan, but also have to deal with its neutral or even negative position with regard to itself; this will weaken American influence

in East Asia. This could be followed by changes in the policy line of China and other countries of the region.³ On the economic level, the system of specialization and cooperation could be destroyed, bottlenecks could be engendered in the economies of the two countries and prices could rise. The United States could lose a large sales market.

Obviously, the statements of these bourgeois researchers and politicians are hypothetical and alarmist and are distinguished by oversimplification, but they are a clear sign of the U.S. ruling class' growing awareness of the severity and danger of its conflicts with Japanese monopolist capital and its fear of the devastating implications of centrifugal tendencies in the development of present-day capitalism.

The inclination of American experts to exaggerate Japan's success in economic, scientific and technical competition with the United States also warrants consideration. It is largely due to the bourgeois authors' efforts to advertise the "Japanese miracle" as a means of convincing the public of the viability and promise of the capitalist method of production: Americans, they imply, merely have to employ Japanese methods of state-monopolist regulation and management on the level of individual companies. For ideological reasons, it is convenient to use the "Japanese menace" to validate assaults on the interests of the laboring masses, such as cuts in government social spending allegedly for the purpose of improving economic conditions, beating competitors and upholding "American values." The class content of government and monopoly policy is not as noticeable in this case. Finally, Japan is being portrayed as the only culprit for the most severe problems of the American and world capitalist economies.

What are the main spheres of U.S.-Japanese economic conflicts in the 1980's?

Trade Conflicts

Trade is the main sphere of American-Japanese relations from the standpoint of economic importance and the severity of conflicts.

In the first half of the 1980's the United States received one-fourth of all Japanese exports--twice the amount received by the Common Market countries and approximately the same as the amount exported to Southeast Asian countries. The U.S. share of Japanese imports is exceeded only by the share of Southeast Asia and represents around 18 percent, or three times the indicator of the EEC countries.⁴

The development of American-Japanese trade in the last decade was distinguished by a chronic and constantly growing U.S. deficit, which was estimated at 50 billion dollars in 1985 (see Table 1). It was largely the result of cyclical and transitory factors. The Japanese economy emerged from the last crisis more slowly than the American one, as a result of which the Japanese demand for goods from the United States rose more slowly than the American demand for imported goods, including goods from Japan. Another of the main reasons for the deficit was the excessively high exchange rate of the dollar, which undermined the competitive prices of American goods.⁵

Table 1. U.S. Trade with Japan, billions of dollars

<u>Categories</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
Exports*	9.4	20.6	21.5	20.7	21.5	23.2
Agricultural goods	3.1	6.1	6.6	5.5	6.2	--
Finished manufactured goods	3.2	8.6	9.5	9.4	10.1	--
High technology goods	1.4	4.0	4.7	4.6	5.4	--
Imports**	12.3	33.0	39.9	39.9	43.6	57.3
Finished manufactured goods	11.9	32.1	39.2	39.1	42.7	--
High technology goods	2.7***	7.8	10.6	11.1	14.3	--
Balance	-2.9	-12.4	-18.4	-19.2	-22.1	-34.1
Finished manufactured goods	-8.7	-23.5	-29.7	-29.7	-32.6	--
High technology goods	-1.3***	-3.8	-5.9	-6.5	-8.9	--

* Prices include cost of delivering goods to port.

** Prices include cost of shipping goods to port of destination and insurance.

*** Estimates.

Compiled according to data in "U.S. Trade Performance in 1981 and Outlook. U.S. Department of Commerce," Wash., 1984, p 61; SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, June 1985, pp 46-48.

A significant role was also played by such tendencies of the 1960's and 1970's as the U.S. lag in the modernization of capital equipment, in the growth of R & D expenditures and in the augmentation of labor productivity. In the first half of the 1980's the United States took a number of measures to partially or completely surmount these tendencies. It will take a long time, however, for these to strengthen the competitive potential of American goods.

Nevertheless, American forecasts indicate the possibility of the improvement of U.S. trade positions and the intensification of U.S. exports in the second half of the 1980's as a result of the anticipated more energetic economic growth of Japan and its import demands and as a result of the declining exchange rate of the dollar, the stabilization of manpower outlays in the United States and the establishment of more competitive prices for American goods.⁶

Trade in finished manufactured goods occupies an important place in American-Japanese relations. Japan receives 5 percent of all U.S. exported finished goods, representing more than a third of all Japanese imports of these goods. In turn, Japan is the largest overseas supplier of finished products to the United States. In 1984 the Japanese share of the total value of American imports of finished goods was around 25 percent. Japanese monopolies have been specializing in a few export fields with the support of their government. In the 1970's they were able to gain strong positions in American imports of durable consumer goods and the products of ferrous metallurgy. In the first half of the 1980's Japanese exports to the American market also included the

products of the automotive, machine tool and electrical equipment industries: On the average, Japanese suppliers accounted for more than half of all American annual imports of automobiles, buses and trucks, around 40 percent of the machine tools, half of the computers and office equipment and one-fourth of the monitoring and testing equipment.⁷

There is another side to this situation: Japan is heavily dependent on the American market. On the average, it annually receives 60 percent of all Japanese exports of the products of non-electrical machine building, up to half of the products of electrical equipment and 40 percent of transport machine building, more than 75 percent of its sound and video equipment, etc. In general, Japan is more dependent on the American market than any other developed capitalist state (with the exception of Canada): The American market absorbs 26.2 percent of its exports, as compared to 13.5 percent of England's, 6.6 percent of the FRG's and 5.6 percent of France's (in 1982).

The use of the latest scientific and technical achievements is the main trump card allowing the United States to surmount fierce competition in the Japanese market: More than 53 percent of all its exports of finished goods to Japan are high technology products. The proportion accounted for by the latter in Japanese deliveries of finished goods to the United States is much smaller--35 percent--but in terms of value Japan's exports of high technology products to the United States have exceeded their imports from the United States for a long time (see Table 1). This testifies that Japan has been extremely successful in the American markets for high technology goods and traditional finished items.

It must be borne in mind, however, that most of the Japanese exports of high technology items are mass-produced, standardized products: durable consumer goods and office equipment. Japan still holds a weak position in the export of the products of the aerospace industry, nuclear power engineering, large computers and the software for them.

The consistently high competitive potential of many American products is reflected in U.S. control of much of the Japanese market for finished manufactured goods.

The United States manufactures half of all the machines and equipment Japan buys. The U.S. share of Japanese imports of airplanes, aircraft engines, motor vehicles, computers, pumps and centrifuges, metal-working equipment, electrical monitoring and testing equipment and scientific and optical equipment ranges from 40 to 95 percent. It is indicative, for example, that 90 percent of all the airplanes in Japan came from the United States. The American IBM and Sperry Rand corporations control 56 percent of the large computer market.

The United States exports many more products of the processing industry to Japan than to, for instance, the FRG, although the latter is the largest importer of finished goods after the United States and is regarded as a country with a wide open market. Nevertheless, the American side has expressed extreme displeasure with the situation in the trade in finished goods with

Japan. The United States is demanding that the Japanese market be opened completely to American exports, accusing its competitor of unyielding protectionism. In particular, it points to the high Japanese import duties inhibiting imports of U.S. products of the timber industry, alcoholic beverages, computers, their components and attachments, agricultural machinery, automobile parts, tobacco, etc. The Japanese side's excessive protection of the telecommunications equipment market has also been discussed on the level of intergovernmental relations.

According to the estimates of American experts, the elimination of high customs duties, quotas and other restrictions on imports of the products of the timber industry could increase U.S. exports of wood to Japan by a billion dollars by 1990, rather than the 500 million anticipated under present conditions. Japan's protectionist measures in the tobacco trade have given the United States no opportunity for development in the fourth-largest cigarette market in the world. Cigarette sales in Japan total 10 billion dollars a year. Imported cigarettes, mainly from the United States, account for only 1.4 percent of the total. According to American estimates, the elimination of tariff and non-tariff restrictions on cigarette imports would increase the American share of the Japanese market to 20-50 percent.

Japan has responded by pointing out the fact that its market for finished goods is less protected than the American one: Japanese duties are lower and its import quotas are fewer in number. According to some estimates, if the United States and Japan should completely eliminate all protectionist barriers in bilateral trade, as the United States is advising, this would be more convenient for Japan, while the U.S. deficit in trade with Japan would only increase.⁸

There are severe conflicts between the two countries in the sphere of agricultural trade. Japan's agrarian protectionism is the source of extreme displeasure in the United States, but it is nevertheless the largest sales market for U.S. agricultural products: This is where almost one-fifth of all U.S. agricultural exports are sold, including a third of the meat exported from the United States, more than 40 percent of the sorghum, 60 percent of the fish and 20 percent of the fruit.⁹ Since American imports of agricultural products from Japan are negligible, this trade is an important source of income for the United States. It is not surprising that the United States is demanding the elimination of Japanese barriers limiting American exports of beef, oranges, citrus juice and leather. It is demanding the revision of quarantine and other requirements inhibiting imports of many products of the food industry and of fresh produce.

The Japanese side acknowledges that American food shipments play a decisive role in Japan's food supply; with a view to Washington's inclination to use the "food weapon" for political purposes, Japan is striving to safeguard its "food security," which demands the protection of its own agriculture from foreign competition. Americans are also being asked to take the domestic political situation in Japan into account: Inhabitants of agrarian regions are an important part of the ruling party's constituency.¹⁰

At the same time, the Japanese side has pointed to the United States' own protectionist policy in agricultural trade. For example, the value of U.S. beef imports must not exceed 8 percent of all beef sales in the country (the quota in Japan is four times as high--32 percent). Besides this, there are U.S. quotas on imports of sugar, dairy products, wheat, peanuts and cotton. In addition, some states have their own restrictions.

Besides this, the high effectiveness of domestic agriculture allows the United States to resort to protectionist measures in agricultural trade to a lesser degree than Japan. According to UNCTAD data, the proportion of U.S. agrarian imports subject to non-tariff restrictions is 15.9 percent, but in Japan it is 49.6 percent (40.9 percent in the EEC countries). Customs duties on agricultural imports are much higher in Japan.¹¹

The United States is exerting the strongest pressure on Japan to direct trade with it into a favorable channel for itself. Since it is impossible to blame the current Japanese success in the U.S. market only on "unfair competition" and dumping, the American side has relied on expanded exports to Japan in the 1980's, although it has not given up its measures to restrict imports of some goods. The Reagan Administration has resorted to severe pressure on Japan with the aim of eliminating existing obstacles impeding American exports and is demanding measures to stimulate purchases of U.S. goods wherever these restrictions are absent. Bills to limit Japanese exports are submitted annually to the U.S. Congress for discussion and are also being used for blackmail in negotiations.

The Japanese side has had to make concessions regularly. The Japanese government took particularly substantial measures in 1982-1985. In 1982 it announced the decision to eliminate 67 of the 99 non-tariff barriers objected to by the United States and other exporters, the cancellation of duties on imports of 96 items and the reduction of duties on another 119. Quotas on imports of several food products were raised. It also announced that foreign suppliers would take part in decisionmaking in the sphere of standardization, that the retail trade network would be authorized to sell imported tobacco products in the second half of the 1980's, that the services of foreign firms would be enlisted in carrying out the Japanese reform of "business practices and the system of distribution" and that the trade in services would be liberalized. In 1983 the Japanese parliament revised the national system for the inspection of imported goods and amended 17 laws listing the technical and other requirements of imported products to strengthen the connection between national and international standards, accept the results of foreign inspections and tests, etc.¹² In November 1983, when President Reagan was in Tokyo, a decision was made to raise the exchange rate of the yen in relation to the dollar and lower the barriers impeding American agricultural exports.

The United States was able to gain a Japanese promise to buy more American coal. In 1984 participation by U.S. corporations in state auctions in Japan was expanded, duties on imported foods from the United States were eliminated or reduced, and the quotas on these imports were raised again.¹³ In 1985 Japan again "voluntarily" limited its automobile exports to the United States (the improvement of the situation in the automotive industry later allowed Reagan to release Japan from this commitment).

All of this has been accompanied by pronounced dissatisfaction in Japan with U.S. economic policy, particularly its high interest rates, high dollar exchange rate and growing federal budget deficit, which are having a negative effect on the development of the Japanese economy. Huge quantities of Japanese financial resources are moving to the United States and the total cost of Japanese oil imports has risen dramatically because world oil prices are set in dollars.¹⁴

Japan's concessions apparently played an important role in 1982 and 1983, when exports of U.S. finished products in general were at a standstill or were even decreasing while deliveries to Japan continued to grow. In 1983, for example, exports of these goods to developed capitalist countries were 4.8 billion dollars below the 1981 figure, exports to developing countries were 17.8 billion dollars below this figure, but exports to Japan were 600 million dollars higher.¹⁵

Nevertheless, the problem of the growing American trade deficit still exists. This is why people in the United States are making statements about the ineffectiveness of these measures from the standpoint of "facilitating the access" of American goods to the Japanese market. In one of his speeches, President Reagan stated that "many American companies still cannot compete in Japan on an equal basis.... The size of the deficit has given rise to mounting protectionist feelings in the United States. For this reason, I am asking the Japanese Government and people to move...more quickly to open the Japanese market to competing foreign goods."¹⁶ Reagan simultaneously denied the negative influence of U.S. economic policy on Japanese development.

In general, we can assume that since cardinal changes are unlikely to take place in U.S. trade relations with Japan in the 1980's, the friction in this sphere resulting from heightened American demands will increase even if the Japanese side should make further concessions.

Conflicts in the Movement of Capital

Problems in mutual capital penetration have been an important part of U.S.-Japanese economic conflicts in the 1980's. The United States has complained that the levels of U.S. direct private investments in Japan are far below potential capabilities. It is true that Japan's share of the total direct capital investments of U.S. corporations abroad in 1984 was 3.6 percent and was smaller than the share of Great Britain (13.8 percent) and the FRG (6.5 percent). By the end of the 1980's, however, the lower Japanese indicator could disappear because Japan now ranks high in terms of the rates and volume of increase in American direct investments: Total investments tripled between 1970 and 1984, but investments in Japan increased 5.6-fold. In 1982 the total net value of direct private U.S. capital investments abroad was 6.8 billion dollars below the previous year's figure, including a decrease of 2.1 billion dollars in Western Europe and 900 million dollars in Canada. In Japan, on the other hand, there was an increase of almost 200 million dollars in the direct investments of U.S. corporations.¹⁷ The next year, in 1983, these investments increased by 1.1 billion dollars and totaled almost 8.1 billion, and in 1984 they increased to 8.4 billion dollars (see Table 2).

Table 2. Dynamics and Sectorial Structure of Private Direct U.S. Investments in Japan, millions of dollars

Categories	1970	1975	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Total ¹	1491	3339	6274	6755	6928	8059	8374
Petroleum refining industry	540	1313	1566	1737	1708	2011	2100
Processing industry, other than oil refining							
Total	753	1557	2990	3236	3462	4071	4120
Food	...	93	166	185	235	271	193
Chemicals	...	360	696	767	776	823	844
Metallurgy	...	15	82	80	(D)	(D)	(D)
Machine building, other than transport	...	787	1352	1413 ³	1498 ³	1749 ³	1797 ³
Transport machine building	...	124	269	300	(D)	(D)	(D)
Other	...	179	425	490	479	742	833
Trade	(XX)	309	1130	1215	1137	1257	1387
Finance and insurance ²	(XX)	77	191	221	254	347	364
Others	198	82	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)	(D)

(XX)--included in "other" sectors; (...)--data unavailable; (D)--date classified by U.S. Department of Commerce; 1--In some cases the total in this table will not be equivalent to the sum of sectorial indicators because the data on some sectors is classified; 2--Other than banking; 3--Including electrical engineering equipment: 228 million in 1981, 233 million in 1982, 282 million in 1983 and 354 million in 1984.

Calculated according to data in: SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, August 1978, pp 27-28, August 1981, p 32, August 1984, p 29, August 1985, p 36; "Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific," Canberra, 1972, p 96.

The direct investments are supposed to secure a breakthrough in the "Japanese market through sales of goods manufactured by American affiliates in Japan, through guaranteed access to the Japanese trade network for the products of U.S. parent companies and through exports of American equipment, parts and components for subsequent assembly in Japan." The United States has made comparatively little use of intracorporate channels in Japan to date: According to the latest available data, at the end of the 1970's almost 40 percent of all American exported products of the processing industry were sent to overseas branches and affiliates of U.S. corporations. That same year, however, only 17 percent of all American exports of these products to Japan were sent to branches and affiliates.¹⁸

Therefore, in the opinion of the United States, substantial opportunities for the augmentation of exports are not being utilized, and this is being blamed on various Japanese restrictions. The Japanese Government is not only openly complicating foreign capital investments in some sectors and companies but also has the power to make changes in planned foreign investments or cancel

them if they are contrary to the interests of the economy or of various Japanese companies. This is accomplished through advance individual government agency investigations of foreign direct capital investments in Japan. Restrictions on purchases of stock capital generally preclude the acquisition of a Japanese company by foreigners. There are limits on the amount of stock foreigners can hold in Japanese companies.¹⁹

There is no question that the American side is deliberately overdramatizing the situation: In spite of these restrictions, the United States accounts for around half of all foreign direct investments in Japan. Furthermore, in the first half of the 1980's the U.S. share of all new foreign direct private capital investments in Japan was over 90 percent, leading to the absolute and relative reinforcement of the position of American capital, which already plays an important role in certain key sectors of the Japanese economy. Branches of American companies account for around 40 percent of the output of petroleum products in Japan and around 30 percent of the computers.²⁰

American accounts also do not include shipments to Japan from branches and affiliates of American transnational corporations outside the United States: At the end of the 1970's the value of these shipments was equivalent to the value of half of all U.S. exports to Japan. American TNC control is particularly noticeable in fuel and raw material supplies. At the beginning of the 1980's, for example, their overseas branches and affiliates accounted for around 40 percent of all Japanese oil imports. Japan has made an energetic attempt to reduce its dependence on deliveries from the overseas branches of U.S. TNC's, especially the oil corporations. The Japanese are also demanding that the value of these deliveries be taken into account in response to the U.S. demands for increased purchases of American goods. The total value of oil deliveries by American corporations from "third" countries was 20 billion dollars a year on the average in the first half of the 1980's. These transactions are not included in the balance of U.S. trade with Japan but they are reflected in the results of Japan's trade with other countries.

Deliveries by the overseas enterprises of Japanese companies to the United States are apparently much smaller. One reason is that a much higher percentage of Japanese direct private investments is concentrated in raw material branches and is engaged in satisfying primarily Japanese demands. There is also a higher percentage of capital investments in services. Furthermore, at the beginning of the 1980's Japan's total overseas private direct investments were equivalent to only 17 percent of the American figure and the sales of Japanese overseas branches were equivalent to only 8 percent of the American figure.²¹

One of the American side's serious arguments is that Japanese firms in the United States are supposedly not subject to any kind of restrictions and that their direct private investments there increased almost 3.5-fold just between 1980 and 1984 and exceeded 14.8 billion dollars, and have exceeded direct U.S. private capital investments in Japan since 1981. In 1985, 342 Japanese enterprises in the United States employed 150,000 Americans.²² The percentage accounted for by Japanese firms in total foreign direct private investments in the United States (9.3 percent in 1984), however, is only one-fifth as high as

the same indicator for American companies in Japan. Their influence in the U.S. economy also seems to be much less significant because most of the investments are still in the service sphere. It is true that the situation is changing: By imposing various restrictions against exports by Japanese companies in the 1970's and 1980's, the United States motivated them to transfer the production of some of their goods directly to the United States. The capital investments of Japanese companies in the U.S. processing industry increased 2.7-fold, according to some estimates, just between 1980 and 1984 and totaled almost 2.3 billion dollars.

On the one hand, Japanese direct investments are welcomed in the United States because they "create new jobs," which is naturally of considerable importance at a time of colossal unemployment. On the other hand, there are also serious objections. In particular, as R. Meyers from the Hoover Institute pointed out, the operations of Japanese enterprises in the United States lead to large imports of machines and equipment, as well as parts and components, from Japan, and this has an adverse effect on the U.S. balance of trade.²³

In the first half of the 1980's Japan acted on some of the U.S. complaints. In particular, in April 1984 a decision was made to promote the growth of American capital investments by providing potential investors with the necessary information and allowing them cheap credit from the Japan Development Bank. Statements by Ronald Reagan and members of his administration indicate, however, that one of the chief aims of U.S. policy in relations with Japan is the elimination of all barriers impeding the growth of U.S. capital investments.²⁴

The Battle for Access to Technology

The trade in scientific and technical expertise has become one of the principal and most rapidly expanding forms of American-Japanese contacts. Until recently, U.S. policy was distinguished primarily by attempts to use U.S. scientific and technical superiority profitably, while Japan's policy was distinguished by the desire to eliminate the technical lag between it and the more developed capitalist states.

The 1980's made a number of changes in this situation, but in general the United States still has an advantage over Japan in the commercial exchange of technology. Exports of American technology to Japan were 4.6 times as great as imports from there in 1983.²⁵ This tendency diverges from the overall development of Japan's technological trade because it is marked by the equalization of exports and imports. According to Japanese data, in 1981 the ratio of Japanese payments to income was 3:1 (50:1 in 1960 and 4:1 in 1975). Furthermore, if Japanese payments on long-term licensing agreements concluded in previous decades are excluded from these calculations, it turns out that Japan has been selling more technology than it has been buying since 1972.

This contradiction is partially due to the fact that most of Japanese technology cannot compete on the American market. Sales are rising primarily in the developing countries, and only around 10 percent of the total is being sent to the United States (the American share of Japan's technological imports is around 50 percent).

In some fields, however, Japanese technology is approaching the American level or has even surpassed it, which was reflected specifically in the increased U.S. purchases of new scientific and technical items invented in Japan: These purchases increased 1.5-fold just between 1981 and 1983. Japan is ahead of Great Britain, the FRG and France in terms of the value of technology sold in the United States.

Japan is not making any moves to share its most important scientific and technical achievements, and this has aroused extreme displeasure in the United States. Since 1978, for example, the United States has been pressuring Japan for access to military technical achievements although its laws prohibit the export of weapons produced in Japan.

In fall 1983 the United States was able to accomplish the signing of a memorandum in which the Japanese side consented to give the United States access to its military technical achievements. The United States was the only country to be granted this right, and this was described by Assistant Secretary of State P. Wolfowitz as a "major achievement."²⁶ The implementation of the terms of the memorandum has been an extremely slow process, however, because the Japanese feel that the offer of the latest military technology to the American side even within the framework of intergovernmental cooperation will allow American rival corporations to acquire technological secrets.

Japanese firms have taken a similar position. For example, it is difficult for U.S. corporations to acquire licenses for innovations in semiconductor production.²⁷

As Hong Kong's FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW noted, the Japanese are afraid that the Americans will acquire these innovations and then refuse to sell Japan military systems developed with their use "as a result of the U.S. laws controlling the export of this kind of equipment." Certain Japanese circles are objecting to the prospect that their country will become "one component of the U.S. military machine." It took more than 2 years after the memorandum was signed for the United States to acquire the first military technical innovations developed in Japan.²⁸

It appears that Japanese ruling circles have no unanimous opinion with regard to U.S. access to military technical secrets. Pro-American officials support their transmission to the United States, others express some degree of disagreement and still others are demanding the reciprocal transmission of U.S. military technical achievements.

At the same time, Japanese monopolist capital and the government are purposefully continuing to import technology in fields they categorize as strategic from the economic and political standpoints. In particular, the desire for access to the latest technology was one of the reasons for the organization of the production of modern weapons jointly with the United States in Japan--the F-15 fighter, the P-3C antisubmarine plane and various missile systems. According to former U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce L. Olmer, the cost of producing the F-15 and P-3C planes in Japan is 2.5 times as high as the cost of

importing them, but the Japanese side is striving to acquire the military aviation technology needed to begin the intensive development of its aircraft industry and to turn Japan into a competitive producer of civilian aircraft and space systems.²⁹

The United States has expressed displeasure with the efforts of Japanese ruling circles to achieve scientific and technical superiority by instituting special programs in the 1980's to stimulate the development of electronics, the production of telecommunications equipment, new materials and new elements for the semiconductor industry, the aviation industry, biochemistry, the exploitation of ocean resources and the search for new alternative sources of energy.

The Japanese Government has been accused of granting its firms financial and tax privileges and advantages in the financing of R & D projects, of placing government orders to secure a large sales market for new products, of protecting the national market against imports of competitive foreign goods and of actively stimulating exports.

Representatives of American big business assert that the policy of the Japanese Government is primarily promoting the successful penetration of American and other markets by Japanese companies. It puts U.S. corporations in a situation of "unfair" competition: Their products must compete with goods developed with the aid of government subsidies, introduced into production and offered on the market within a shorter period of time, and financed with loan capital costing far less than the capital available to American corporations.

Nevertheless, it is no secret that the United States itself has used and is still using special government regulation programs. The American Government played an important role in the development of semiconductor production, computer engineering and telecommunications equipment production, and in the 1980's the scales of U.S. and Japanese government efforts to achieve superiority in key fields of technology were approximately equivalent.³⁰

Nevertheless, the United States has questioned the correspondence of Japanese policy to the principles of international trade recorded in the GATT and have declared the need to make provisions for strict sanctions against Japan. It is simultaneously conducting a policy of "arm-twisting" in bilateral talks, aimed if not at the cancellation of the abovementioned special programs (which is acknowledged to be unrealistic), then at the guarantee of complete U.S. access to their results, participation by U.S. corporations in the programs and the creation of an American-Japanese scientific and technical complex--and certainly in the interests of the United States and on U.S. terms. Addressing Congress, Stanford University Professor E. Feigenbaum remarked: "Our merits and leadership and the Japanese concentrated collective efforts and zeal could produce excellent results." A similar opinion has been expressed by W. Baker, chairman of the board of Rockefeller University and former Bell Laboratories executive.³¹

The American Government is striving to attach Japanese scientific and technical development more closely to American development within the framework of

intergovernmental cooperation and cooperation on the private level. The main undertaking in this field was the creation of an intergovernmental American-Japanese working group on high technology in April 1982 at the insistence of the United States to coordinate policy in the development of high technology industries and the trade in their products, especially the products of the semiconductor industry, supercomputers and fiber optics. As the work of this group revealed, the United States is using it to strengthen its own position in Japanese high technology markets, to acquire long-term and steady access to the results of Japanese R & D projects and to establish close cooperation on the level of private capital in the most promising advanced fields of science and technology. The group's first recommendations envisaged the creation of a special body with the participation of private business for the joint collection of information in high technology industries (starting with the semiconductor industry) and broader participation by firms in both countries in filling the orders of their governments.

The United States is also planning to use Japan's scientific potential and subordinate it to U.S. strategic interests by involving Japan in the "Star Wars" program. Taking the dangerous road of militarization, the Nakasone government announced its consent to participate in this program in October 1985. With its approval, American companies began consulting with Japan's largest military-industrial companies with the aim of involving them in the joint creation of "Strategic Defense Initiative" systems.

In this way, the United States is obviously trying to restore and reinforce its position in economic competition with Japan. Making use of Japan's politico-military dependence, the United States, as the analysis demonstrated, is relying on a number of its important advantages, especially in science and technology. Japan's dependence on American deliveries of food and energy resources is being maintained. Washington has been increasingly insistent in its demands pertaining to bilateral trade, the overall foreign economic policy of Japan and aspects of the state-monopolist regulation of its economy. The U.S. demands have been at least partially, if not completely, satisfied to date. The tendencies turning Japan into the second-ranking capitalist state in terms of economic and technological potential, however, could make it less compliant in the future and intensify American-Japanese conflicts to an even greater extent.

FOOTNOTES

1. R. Hofheinz, Jr., and K. Calder, "The Eastasia Edge," N.Y., 1982; "U.S.-Japanese Economic Relations: Cooperation, Competition and Confrontation," edited by D. Tasca, N.Y.-Oxford, 1980; S. Schlossstein, "Trade War. Greed, Power and Industrial Policy on Opposite Sides of the Pacific," N.Y., 1984.
2. "Challenges and Opportunities in U.S.-Japan Relations," Wash.-Tokyo, September 1984, p 22.
3. Ibid.

4. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, January 1984, p 3.
5. According to the estimates of the American magazine BUSINESS WEEK, at least two-thirds of the U.S. deficit in trade with Japan in 1984 was the result of the excessively high exchange rate of the dollar--BUSINESS WEEK, 8 April 1985, pp 35-37.
6. See, for example, "Review of the U.S. Economy," Data Resources, Inc. (DRI), August 1985, pp 72-78.
7. Calculated according to data in "Highlights of U.S. Export and Import Trade, 1982-1984."
8. "U.S.-Japan Trade Relations," Hearings...House of Representatives, March 10, April 26, 27, 1983, Wash., 1983, pp 460, 478; "Trade and Development Report, 1984," UNCTAD, N.Y., 1985, pp 198-209.
9. FOREIGN AGRICULTURE, September 1984, pp 13-17.
10. For a more detailed discussion, see, for example, "U.S.-Japanese Agricultural Trade Relations," Wash., 1982; Y. Okawara, "Japan's Farm Policy," SPEAKING OF JAPAN TODAY (Tokyo), February 1984, pp 7-10.
11. "Trade and Development Report, 1984," pp 201, 208.
12. "Report on Trade Mission to Japan and the Republic of Korea," Wash., 1983, pp 3-6.
13. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, September 1984, pp 29-31.
14. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 7 May 1985.
15. Calculated according to data in "U.S. Trade Performance in 1983," p 48.
16. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, March 1985, p 9.
17. Calculated according to data in SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, August 1984, pp 27, 29; August 1985, p 36.
18. "U.S.-Japan Trade Relations," p 271.
19. As a result of these restrictions, U.S. TNC's are much less frequently able to organize the complete control of branches and affiliates in Japan: The proportions accounted for by companies in which American corporations hold 50 percent (or more) of the stock capital in the total assets and sales of firms with U.S. capital participation are 16.1 percent and 25.5 percent, whereas the average figures for developed capitalist countries are 71.3 percent and 75.4 percent (SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, October 1981, p 51).
20. Calculated according to data in: S. Schlossstein, Op. cit., p 267; "High Technology Industries: Profiles and Outlooks. The Computer Industry," Wash., 1983, p 25.

21. "International Direct Investment: Global Trends and the U.S. Role," Wash., 1984, p 45; "Transnational Corporations in World Development. The Third Survey," United Nations, N.Y., 1983, p 366.
22. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, March 1985, p 41. The United States limits foreign direct capital investments for reasons of "national security" in the aircraft and shipbuilding industries, nuclear power engineering, banking and communications (WORLD POLITICS, April 1982, p 364).
23. VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, 15 July 1985, p 60.
24. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, March 1985, p 41; April 1985, p 14.
25. Calculated according to data in SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, June 1984, pp 43, 64-67.
26. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, September 1984, p 32.
27. "High Technology: Public Policies for the 1980's," Wash., 1983, p 8.
28. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1 August 1985, p 35.
29. BUSINESS AMERICA, 24 January 1983, p 7.
30. "Novyye tendentsii v ekonomicheskom razvitii SShA i Yaponii" [New Trends in the Economic Development of the United States and Japan], Moscow, 1984, p 197.
31. "Japanese Technological Advances and Possible United States Responses Using Research Joint Ventures," Hearings..., June 1983, Wash., 1984, p 120.

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POPULARITY OF PERSONAL COMPUTERS IN U.S. DISCUSSED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 86 (signed to press 19 Mar 86) pp 46-55

[Article by G. B. Kochetkov: "The Americans and the Personal Computer"]

[Text] When the first computers made their appearance more than 40 years ago, they were cumbersome and slow machines with many vacuum tubes and mechanical parts and they were uneconomical and unreliable and had little in common with the neat plastic-encased microcomputers of today. Nevertheless, their appearance signaled a breakthrough in a new field of knowledge and human activity.

For a long time the potential of computers was hidden behind the walls of computer centers, the approaches to which were reliably guarded by experts in their operation--programmers and systems analysts. The influence of computers was mediated and was not as great as forecasts of the 1950's had predicted. Only the appearance of microcomputers of various types and for various purposes broke this monopoly, but this gave rise to many new problems.

Last year a delegation of specialists from the USSR Academy of Sciences visited the United States to learn about the introduction and use of personal computers and saw this equipment at work in many kindergartens and schools, stores and banks, the transportation network, university centers and business offices.

Computers as Mass Consumer Goods

One of the main conclusions of the trip was that computers can no longer be categorized only as means of production, as they were in the past. Many leading department stores offer their customers a variety of personal computers, accessories and software for use in the home or office. In a department store in Palo Alto (California), we saw more than a dozen computers of various brands, including the IBM professional XT computer.

Fierce competition has lowered the prices of the cheaper models to 250-300 dollars. This is the price, for example, of the Commodore-64 personal computer outfit (a central processing unit, disk drive, printer and set of applied word processing programs). It is advertised as the cheapest professional word processor. For playing simple games and secondary school academic programs, a computer can be acquired for just 80-100 dollars.¹

Personal computers are used widely in the most diverse spheres of activity: Word processors and automated work positions² in offices; cash registers and inventory control systems in stores; automatic tellers in banks; hotel reservation systems and systems for the sale of tickets to the theater, concerts and athletic events in the leisure industry; advance ticket sale systems and automatic subway turnstiles in transportation, etc.³ Many aspects of societal life are changing radically under the influence of computer-based automation. American experts agree that games, the automation of office work and the use of computers in communications systems will continue to have a decisive effect on attitudes toward computers in the near future. This is confirmed, in particular, by the data of an analysis of the readers of one of the most popular magazines in this field--PERSONAL COMPUTING.

In 1984 the publication had 625,000 subscribers, most of whom were executives and specialists (more than 85 percent). All of them had one or several personal computers and a fairly broad variety of accessories. A special study conducted for the magazine by the Yankelovich Skelly & White firm indicated that the main motive for the acquisition of a PC now is the desire to use time more productively, save time, improve business and personal communications and, in general, enhance the quality of life and raise the standard of living. Many readers said that they had gained new opportunities they had never even dreamed of before acquiring the new equipment. Readers listed the following as the main spheres of PC use: word processing (60 percent), entertainment programs (40 percent), personal data storage (30 percent), bookkeeping and accounting (30 percent), educational programs (25 percent), etc.

The number of PC's owned by the population is still rising, and according to the magazine's data, 91 percent of the owners paid for their purchases with their own money while 9 percent were reimbursed by their firms. The reason for this, we were told, was that the common opinion is that computerization will aggravate the employment problem. In the struggle for jobs, people familiar with computers will have the best chances. More than half of the PC owners were planning to buy a second machine or replace theirs with more powerful models. According to Software Access, a California consultative firm, computers are now mainly purchased by specialists who have already owned at least one PC. An analysis of computer sales in California stores indicated that 87 percent of the customers were buying a second machine, and that 52 percent of them would be using the new computer at work while 35 percent would be using it in the home.⁴

After we came back home, we read in the business press that PC sales had declined sharply in the first quarter of 1985. Apple Computers had even closed its plants temporarily and IBM had stopped producing a home computer. The market was saturated. Experts associate this with the fact that computers are still being used in business and are not being used widely in the home as yet. This will require serious changes in public demand, and this is a relatively slow process. The personal computer controlling household appliances, serving as a household information center and keeping household accounts still exists only in the pages of futurological forecasts. It is precisely from this standpoint that the figures cited above should be viewed: Personal computers are now being bought only by those who can use them to

make their work more productive. American specialists believe, however, that this is only temporary and that computers will replace automobiles, television sets and refrigerators as symbols of the American way of life in the near future and will become the new national craze.⁵

The Problem of "Learning a Second Language"

Under the influence of the mass computer invasion of American society, many people feel unprepared for the coming computer age and are ashamed of their "computer illiteracy."

People who had lived most of their lives without computers and had only encountered the word now and then in newspapers and magazines were suddenly informed that unless they bought home computers their children would be unable to attend good colleges where these machines are already being used. The mass media inundated the average American with dire warnings: Unless he could acquire "computer literacy," he would slowly but surely be left behind by life and by his colleagues and could not hope for professional advancement.

This evoked various reactions. Ideas of an all-out struggle against the "incomprehensible" computer are always present. From time to time this tension is vented: Computers are blown up, demagnetized, shot at, etc. But this extremist reaction to computerization in general is not the typical American response. The majority are striving to deal with the problem in other ways.

Computer literacy now transcends the bounds of the mere mastery of programming. As Yale University Professor Roger Schank, the renowned American expert on artificial intelligence,⁶ noted, the public must now decide what it should know about computers in order to live in a world filled with them.⁷ In the past, computer literacy implied that a person had to adapt to the new type of machine by learning programming procedures. But there are two sides to the matter of acclimatization in the "man-machine" system, and experience has shown that computer systems can change much more rapidly than the "human component." In the past, the computer was usually engineered to fit the demands of consumers, and not vice versa.

Many experts and representatives of the field of science connected with the creation of artificial intelligence have asserted that the notion that man will have to change to fit the needs of computers in the future is a false alarm! It is the computer that will serve man and be adapted to his needs, and not vice versa. Even now, they point out, a person can communicate with a computer in a language close to conversational speech. The machines have learned to interpret texts, act on oral commands, etc. All of this has been made possible by successes in solving the problems of artificial intelligence. However, they caution, communication with a computer demands the observance of the rules of language and the mastery of simple literacy. The introduction of word processors faced the American public with the urgent problem of mastering the native language. For example, it is more efficient for the specialists themselves to work directly with the word processor but then they must compile the final draft of the document. In the past their mistakes

were corrected by specialists in grammar--secretaries and the majority of typists. Now there is no one to correct the specialist's grammatical errors.

The "Computer City"

The speed of the mastery of new information equipment depends largely on the cultural level, a level now strongly influenced by computerization. One definition of the term culture says that this is a method of transmitting ideas from one individual to another by various means--symbols, actions or imitations. As long as the computer belonged to a select few, it had virtually no influence on the culture of the society. The introduction of personal computers, however, was closely related to many cultural factors. It was no coincidence that the National Science Foundation of the United States even postulated the existence of a "computer cultural revolution." In the beginning of the 1980's the realization of the importance of this new development led to several programs to accelerate the process of change in this sphere. The most famous were the projects of the "computer city" type.⁸

Their main purpose was to give all interested parties a chance to work or play with the personal computer. For this purpose, the organizers of these programs chose certain neighborhoods in cities and towns and installed computers in all public dining establishments, movie theaters, recreational facilities, stores, etc. Volunteers participating in the programs offered all interested parties a chance to have a dialogue with the computer. The software was designed to minimize the rules of operation. Pushing any key would start the dialogue, and the machine itself would conduct it, teaching its partner the elementary rules of operation.

Children became the main participants in these projects in various parts of the United States and spent many hours with computers. The most active participants were issued special pins inscribed "My computer loves me." Children were often the volunteers in the "computer city" and they taught adults. Program organizers asked all owners of home computers to take part in these undertakings and give their neighbors and their children a chance to work or play with the equipment. They were asked to take their PC's to the nearest restaurants, bookstores or building lobbies for this purpose. Many complied with these requests and took an active part in the campaign for "Computer literacy in my home town." The main goal--to arouse public interest in the new information equipment--was attained.

It is understandable that the idea of the "computer city" was actively supported by the producers of the equipment and software because it allowed them to advertise their products and simultaneously expand their market. It is true that these undertakings gradually grew more moderate in scale. We saw an IBM PC in the Stanford University bookstore, but it was operated by an employee who could answer any questions about store inventory. In many department stores the functions of an information bureau are performed by machines operating on a dialogue basis: The customer pushes any key and all subsequent dialogue is conducted by the computer, which tells the customer what to do next. At La Guardia Airport in New York and other airports, we saw IBM display stands with PC's. Bored passengers awaiting the departure of planes

could learn the principles of computer design and operation and simultaneously obtain information about the airport, local points of interest, local public transportation, etc. Many stores selling computers allow visitors to bring in their own disks and use their demonstration models: They feel that this aids in demonstrating the practical uses of the new equipment and arouses the interest of potential customers.

One interesting element of the general campaign to establish a computer culture is the computer center of the Boston Museum of Science. Its organizers wanted to disseminate the knowledge and skills needed for computer operation. Various classes open to all interested parties constitute the main element of the center's work. The most popular are the Sunday classes in "LOGO for Children and Parents." A PC is assigned to each adult and child, and in a special program lasting an hour and a half they learn the fundamentals of LOGO⁹ through dialogue with the computer, compose music and learn to drive a car or fly a plane. Volunteers make up most of the center's personnel staff. We saw instructors from the ages of 12 to 16 teaching adults the art of computer mastery.

We were told often that whereas the mastery of computer operation by adults in their forties or fifties, who occupy the commanding position in society, is a difficult and extremely slow process, children view computers as an integral part of life today. In the past, to be good parents, the father had to have a good job and provide his family with all necessities and the mother had to take care of the household and the children. Everyone knew that major decisions were made in the household by the parents on the basis of their past experience and the information they had accumulated about life. The spread of computers has introduced many changes into these relationships. Their better knowledge of computers gives children access to potential resources as yet (or already) unavailable to adults. For example, at the age of 10 or 12, many schoolchildren test their ability to invent their own games (most of the programmers in the firms developing games are no older than 20).

The U.S. press has reported the high fees earned by schoolchildren for the development of game programs. A group of students between the ages of 13 and 15 from Great Neck (New York) organized a firm in 1980 to distribute a game they had invented, similar to "Space Invaders," and a computer version of the famous game "Monopoly": two 13-year-olds from Del Mar (California) established a firm for the production of games for the computers of the Apple and Texas Instruments firms.¹⁰ These firms begin with the programming of games and then go on to the development of more serious products. This has given rise to several unprecedented conflicts, such as situations in which a child's income from programs far exceeds his father's earnings.

Under these new conditions, parents can no longer insist on traditional family relationships. Parents must not fall behind, and the computer center of the Boston Museum of Science offers them programs for this purpose. For example, mothers can attend special classes to acquire the necessary knowledge to oversee the schoolwork of children taking classes in computer science. There is also a special program offering parents and children a chance to work with educational computer programs available in the center or brought from home.

Group lessons for 12 child-parent teams are overseen by a professional instructor. He is assisted by one or two volunteers, and they are usually of school age.

The center relies on donations from various foundations and from the manufacturers of equipment and software. When we visited the center, it had 30 IBM personal computers, including 3 XT models, around 40 Apple II computers of various types, several Atari computers and single computers of other brands. All of the machines were donated because this is good advertising for the manufacturers.

But the main attraction of the center, according to Director Ron Sweets, is the chance to work with new applied programs. All of the leading program developers also donate their products to the center. By February 1985 its library consisted of more than 400 of the best-known software packages and was still growing. Visitors can take any program off the shelf and do whatever they want with it for 30 minutes (there is a time limit because the demand far exceeds the supply). In addition, the center has organized free classes for Boston public school teachers to familiarize them with possible ways of using PC's in teaching, the fundamentals of LOGO, BASIC and PASCAL, and so forth.¹¹

Games and the Computer Culture

An important element distinguishing the personal computer from previous computers is the possibility of emotional interaction with it. Many American psychologists believe, for example, that the stage of mass computerization has changed the individual's view of his environment. Earlier, in pre-technical times, they say, man animated his surroundings. Technology broke this psychological connection, and only the computer has returned society to a state of spiritual harmony with surrounding realities, but on a new, high technology basis. The tendency of computer users to animate the machines was noticed long ago. For example, children do not simply animate their computer toys but also endow them with emotions, mental processes and even a code of morals. Any child will say that his computer loves him, sympathizes with his problems and so forth. And this goes beyond the limits of a game. Adults and even specialists have a similar relationship with their computers. There have been numerous experiments in which the behavior of people working or playing with computers has been observed. It has been established that a person ascribes human feelings (love or hatred) and the ability to reason to a computer. In one experiment a group of students could play with computers without any kind of restrictions, and all conversations were taped. The researchers discovered that the students gave the computers men's names and treated them as living beings. All of this is disrupting the traditional balance between technology and man.

It was also noted that computer games evoke more emotional interaction than ordinary applied programs. This discovery had two important results. First of all, many applied programs are now supplemented with various game elements to strengthen the person's emotional contact with the computer. In an educational math program, for example, an incorrect answer is followed by an

explosion obliterating the image on the screen, and a correct answer is followed by cheerful music and the appearance of a likeable cartoon hero. Secondly, the game component of the programs is considered to be just as important as their informative and rational component. These emotional contacts and diversions are precisely what have destroyed the traditional view of the computer as a big calculator.

In recent years no innovation in electronics has aroused as many heated debates in the United States as computer games. Many social psychologists who study the problems of computerization have noted that the games played the main role in the spread of the computer culture because they were the reason for the appearance of the first computers in the majority of homes and neighborhood restaurants and snack bars. The games were the target of the older generation's first wave of hostility, and it was the games that aroused the enthusiastic adoration of the young.

It would be difficult to overestimate the role and significance of computer games in the acceleration of the process of computerization. A parallel is often drawn between electronic games and training exercises.¹² The latter are needed to reduce the risk in the training of specialists whose work is highly dangerous (drivers and pilots) and to reduce the cost of their training. Any game is something like a training exercise in human relations. What are their distinctive features?

First of all, they develop the skill of communication with new equipment. After a few hours of video games, a child, and even an adult, will lose all biases against the unfamiliar machine. Corporations are now making extensive use of this tendency: Before computerizing their operations, they give their employees a chance to play chess or any other game with the computer for several days or even weeks. But games cannot aid in eradicating "computer illiteracy"--that is, they cannot teach people to program or to understand the technical aspects of computer operation. They only give the employees an internal incentive and an interest in the new equipment.

Secondly, computer games create a unique emotional environment in the family, the school and wherever else they make their appearance, an environment corresponding to the current phase of the technological revolution. Today children are growing up along with the computer. By the beginning of the next century man's alliance with the computer should be strong enough to eliminate the barrier of hostility toward the new information technology. The population will attain computer fluency and will be able to use computers effectively in any sphere. Sweeping conclusions of a political nature, and sometimes with chauvinistic overtones, are being drawn in the United States on this basis. "Our nation might even lose its leading position in computer production," renowned U.S. journalist and futurologist H. Stine writes in his book "The Silicon Gods," "but it will still be far ahead of the rest of the world in the ability to use information technology effectively."¹³ We falsely assume, he goes on to say, that computer developers, programmers and electronic engineers will make up the nucleus of the future computer generation. In fact, the nucleus is now taking shape among the "obsessed" designers and enthusiastic video game players who cannot imagine existence outside the

computer environment. It will take a long time, Stine writes, before other nations create a similar environment of developing computer games. The nations and people whose children continue to play the old traditional games will suffer a progressive lag in their development, Stine concludes, while the nations where computers, artificial intelligence and other achievements of information technology have become an established part of the culture will be much stronger.¹⁴

Thirdly, a computer can easily teach a child to write, count and play chess. One of the most popular microprocessor-based toys is "Speak-n-Spell." This is a sturdy plastic suitcase the size of an average book. It has an alphabetical keyboard on the outside and a voice synthesizer hidden inside. As soon as a key is pushed, the suitcase begins to talk in the voice of a cartoon hero, saying, for example, "Spell apple!" The child types the letters onto a small screen. If he makes a mistake, the suitcase immediately "notifies" it and suggests that it be corrected. The same kinds of programs are available for regular personal computers, but the capabilities of the latter are infinitely greater. They can teach the child with the aid of a specially constructed dialogue. All parents know how hard it is to force children to write letters to relatives. The computer can help. The child still cannot compose a letter. This is usually done for him by his parents, who ask questions to give him hints or tell him what to do. But this function can also be performed by the home computer. By asking questions or suggesting that the child complete a sentence, a computer program first determines the wording of, for example, birthday greetings to grandmother, and then types the message.¹⁵ The number of teaching programs with game elements of this kind is increasing with unusual speed.

Traditional games have always been connected with objective laws of nature determining the natural limits of the permissible or possible behavior of players. In the computer program the game is limited only by the programmer's imagination. The object of the game can violate any kind of restriction--for example, moving faster than the speed of light, disappearing and reappearing or traveling through time. As J. Weizenbaum, a prominent American expert on information technology, remarked, "the computer programmer creates worlds in which he is the only lawmaker. There is no question that this is also true of the video game developer."¹⁶ The new generation of computer games frees the imagination and allows the player to imagine the unimaginable and move to any world, no matter how fantastic. It is not surprising that the scenarios of the majority of games are based either on fairy tales or on science fiction novels and stories.

An important feature enhancing the appeal of computer games is the ability to learn from past experience. In the majority of games the computer does not repeat earlier errors and gradually engages in more complex behavior as its partner masters the strategy of winning the game. The more complex and costly machines are even equipped with special programs with synthesized congratulations when the player makes a good move and regrets when he loses. The names of the best players are often stored in the memory of the machines, because the player must give the machine his initials before the game starts. If the name is already in the computer memory, it chooses a more complex game

strategy. The United States now has local and national celebrities who are champions of various computer games. This creates strong incentive, particularly in the young, to whom fame in the world of players is just as important as professional acclaim is to adults.

Some of the features of the games have accelerated the spread of programming skills. Children who originally used only programs compiled by others have begun to display a desire for independent creativity. In sociological surveys many have said that they would like to have their own computer for games. Some prefer to acquire games in the form of a series of commands rather than set cassettes or disks. In this case, changes of any kind can be introduced into the program, and the young programmer thereby creates his own unique version of the game. The most interesting versions are shared with friends, and the game begins to exist independently and to be developed and improved.

In addition, it must be said that the programming of games has become a popular pastime for professionals and a means of gaining recognition for novices. The game program market is the largest software market. It has already been estimated at billions of dollars and is still growing. While the cost of producing a single copy of a game is 5 or 10 dollars, the market price can range from 30 to 250 dollars or even more. In the 1980's the lively activity in this market led to the appearance of many small firms producing games and actively involving high school students in this process.

Computer technology is known to be based on the algorithm, which is close to the rules of a game with the aid of which players move into the imaginary world of the game. On this basis, many parallels can be drawn between the game and computer programming. Several writers have noted that the so-called Turing machine¹⁷ can also be viewed as a logical game with strictly defined rules.¹⁸ In a certain sense, the work of the programmer can be regarded as a process of playing a game according to certain rules, and, conversely, the game can be regarded as a form of programming. This sheds light on the role and place of computer games today. The game is now viewed as the first step in the relationship between man and machine, subject to the laws of programming. During the game the player and machine establish a complex set of relationships never observed earlier by psychologists in the person's interaction with other technical systems and innovations.

The games are often compared to television (this is the reason they are usually called video games). American experts believe that this comparison is based on a purely external similarity--the existence of a video screen in both cases. This is where the similarity ends. And the players themselves never draw such parallels. They compare computer games to sports or meditation. The viewer of a television program can simply watch the screen. In games, on the other hand, the player writes the script. He decides whether the shark on the screen will reach his victim or not and whether the brave explorers will be caught by the dragon or will successfully evade it.

Each game is a complex microworld interacting with the player, a world of fantasy but a world visible on the screen. But all of these microworlds have one common feature: Their laws are dictated by the general rules of

programming. The game intensifies the person's interaction with the computer and initiates a contest between them. The majority of games have several levels of complexity, and on the highest levels the player must not only know the game well, but also have a knack for controlling the computer: His fingers must move automatically on the keyboard like the fingers of a musician playing an instrument.

The comparison of games to television leads to the false conclusion that games, just as television, are simply an unproductive and mindless waste of time. American psychologists believe that this is absolutely untrue. The player of the games is active and participates in determining the course of events. To win the game, he must exert will and reason and must choose winning strategies in a complex and dynamic situation.

It is obvious that computer games belong in the age of technological revolution. Their role in the history of culture as a whole is now the subject of serious studies, and today, during the era of computerization, it seems much more significant than it was thought to be in the past. But this naturally raises questions about how the educational and instructive potential of computer games should be used and to what ends the imagination of children and adults should be directed. Many of the games we saw in abundance in computer stores set the following goals: Kill the enemy, beat the opponent, and get rich--in other words, they reflect the "values" of the American way of life.

In general, Americans seem to be acquiring a more sober attitude toward the new technology. They are realizing that it cannot solve the main problems in the use of information media and computers. It should be borne in mind, however, that the computer is just as young today as the automobile was at the beginning of the century or television was at the beginning of the 1950's. Its full potential is still unknown. There is still more speculation about the role and place of the PC in the life of society than scientific appraisals based on in-depth analyses. In this context, the knowledge of the problems the Americans have encountered in their efforts to turn computers into mass consumer goods is of considerable interest and can keep others from making the same mistakes.

FOOTNOTES

1. According to the data of a national survey of stores selling computers by PERSONAL COMPUTING magazine, IBM and Apple Computers held approximately equal positions in the PC market at the beginning of 1985. The most popular models were the IBM PC and the Apple IIc. The next, in order of popularity, were the Apple IIc, the Mackintosh and the personal computers of other firms compatible with IBM models. Furthermore, the Apple computers were purchased primarily for use in the home, and IBM computers were intended for business use. The leader among the IBM computers is the XT. The IBM firm failed in its attempt to market a simple PC for use in the home. The ATT Personal Computer has the greatest potential of the machines compatible with IBM equipment (PERSONAL COMPUTING, November 1984, pp 40-45).

2. The word processor is a personal computer for the editing of texts. The user can enter a new text into the system with a standard keyboard or compose a text from excerpts stored in the computer's memory, perform all sorts of editing operations (changing words, erasing part of the text, correcting letters or parts of words, changing the format, etc.) and then print the text on paper. The automated work position is a computer complex for the automation of certain occupations (economist, physicist, biologist, etc.).
3. Personal computers first appeared on the market in January 1975, and 10 years later there were 18 million of them. In 1984 alone, 7.5 million computers of this category were sold, and 4.8 million of them were intended for use in the home (TIME, 20 May 1985, pp 30-31).
4. POPULAR COMPUTING, January 1985, p 25.
5. TIME, 3 January 1983, p 6.
6. Artificial intelligence is a separate field of science in which technical systems are designed to perform work usually requiring the intellectual participation of a human being.
7. R. Schank and P. Childers, "The Cognitive Computer on Language, Learning and Artificial Intelligence," Reading (Mass.), 1984, p X.
8. N. Frude, "The Intimate Machine. Close Encounters with Computers and Robots," N.Y., 1983, pp 71-73.
9. LOGO is a special language designed to teach children the fundamentals of programming and familiarize them with the "computer culture."
10. J. Rochester and J. Gantz, "The Naked Computer," N.Y., 1983, pp 106-107.
11. In 1984 there were 35 such centers in American museums, parks and other cultural establishments, mainly in the states on the west and east coasts (ENTER, July-August 1984, pp 48-51).
12. H. Stine, "The Silicon Gods," N.Y., 1984, p 89.
13. Ibid., pp 95-96.
14. Ibid.
15. FAMILY COMPUTING, January 1985, pp 50-51.
16. J. Weizenbaum, "Computer Power and Human Reason," San Francisco, 1976, p 115.
17. This was the logical model of an abstract calculator developed by English mathematician Alan Turing in 1936.
18. D. Bolter, "Turing's Man," Chapel Hill (N.C.), 1984, pp 44-45.

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WORK OF COMMISSION OF U.S., SOVIET SOCIAL SCIENTISTS DISCUSSED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 86 (signed to press 19 Mar 86) pp 67-70

[Article by V. A. Voyna: "Science and Politics"]

[Text] The heads of several of the largest scientific establishments in the USSR and the United States and prominent scientists representing different fields of the social sciences gathered in Moscow for the sixth meeting of the commission of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) on contacts in the social sciences to sum up the results of joint research and cooperation, to plan projects for the next 2 years (1986 and 1987) and to sign the appropriate protocol.

It has been exactly 10 years since contacts between specialists in the humanities in the two countries acquired a purposeful and planned nature within the framework of the permanent body which they created and which meets for sessions alternately in Moscow and New York. The anniversary was all the more noteworthy because the meeting took place after the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva, which aroused the hope of livelier exchanges and cooperation between the two countries in various spheres.

The co-chairmen of the meeting were Academician G. A. Arbatov, director of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, on the Soviet side, and Professor Robert Lumiansky, president of the American Council of Learned Societies, the head U.S. organization coordinating the international contacts of scientific establishments in the social sciences, on the American side. As always, the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) and its executive director, Allen Kassof, played an active role in organizing the session on the American side.*

At plenary sessions of the commission, the two sides noted with pleasure that many of their plans had been carried out successfully: There were productive conferences, symposiums and colloquiums of scientists from the two countries and meetings of working groups, joint research projects resulting in printed

* For a discussion of the activity of this organization, see the interview of A. Kassof in SSHA: EPI, 1977, No 9, pp 74-76.

works published in the USSR and the United States, and the constant exchange of information, materials and scientific researchers (trainees). "The work of the commission took place in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and promoted the development of scientific research on a mutually beneficial basis," the protocol signed at the meeting stressed.

As for cooperation in the study of international relations, it can be judged by quantitative indicators (10 ongoing projects, including 6 global and 4 regional, with another 4 planned), by the duration of programs, calculated for the long range, and by their diversity--from a fundamental theory of international relations to specific issues connected with the current situation in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The main thing is that the research findings themselves were productive "due to the active assistance of the Soviet side," as Doctor Legvold, an American speaker at the meeting, stressed. He then added: "We have great hopes for the continuation of our joint work."

The third and fourth annual conferences of USSR and U.S. experts on theoretical aspects of international relations will be held in 1986 and 1987. Research into the prevention of international political crises will be continued. In particular, projected undertakings include the first conference conducted jointly with the Council on Foreign Relations, the second symposium on Far Eastern affairs, the first conference on the Pacific, meetings of experts on Soviet-American relations, arms control and disarmament, and others.

Plans have also been drawn up for cooperation in economic research. Soviet scientists and their colleagues from Stanford University will continue studying world economics and Soviet-American economic relations, including the prospects for cooperation by our two countries in the resolution of major global problems, namely the food, energy, raw material and ecological crises and problems connected with world ocean resources. Other topics of common interest include the use of mathematics in economic research, such as the mathematical modeling of regional development and the development of sectors and enterprises.

Cooperation in the study of history has also been productive. The sixth and seventh colloquiums of historians will be held in the United States and USSR respectively. Materials will be exchanged on a broader scale, scientists will make trips, individual, parallel (or joint) and comparative studies will be continued, and meetings will be organized for specialists in such fields as the use of quantitative methods in historical research (pertaining not only to the USSR and United States, but also to other countries), historical demography, agrarian history, the study of political structures in Russia and the United States and the social movements and social conflicts of the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th.

The two sides noted the importance of studying the history of World War II. The first in a series of projected symposiums, "From the Establishment of the Soviet-American Coalition through 1942," will be held in the Soviet Union at the end of this year, and the second, "Soviet-American Cooperation in 1943," will be held next year in the United States. A bibliography of works by Soviet and American writers on the history of World War II is being compiled jointly.

Plans also call for the first symposium (of two) on the development of the Slavic and Balkan national cultures in the 18th and 19th centuries and the third symposium on archaeology; the materials of collective studies of "International Banking and the Financing of Industry from 1870 to 1914" will be prepared for publication.

"Where the Continents Meet: The People and Cultures of the North Pacific"--this is the theme of a joint exhibit to be organized next year by the Ethnography Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Smithsonian Institute (United States) and the National Museum of Man in Ottawa. The exhibit will be shown in turn in the United States, the USSR and Canada. The exchange of unique items from the collections of the three countries, many with no counterparts in museum collections, will be a major event in world cultural and scientific affairs. American speakers at the session described it as "a bold program with tremendous promise!" They also noted the success of the "extraordinarily informative and remarkably productive" symposium in Kiev on factors influencing ethnic identity. In turn, Soviet speakers noted the success of jointly compiled books published in the USSR and United States--"Where Chukotka and Alaska Meet," "The Traditional Cultures of Siberia and North America," "The Comparative Study of North American Cultures," "The Phenomenon of Longevity" and "Ageing and Longevity."

Examples of collective publications of this type were also cited in the reports of subcommissions on other social sciences. For example, a work describing the results of the sociological study of the "Use of Leisure Time and Its Indicators" will be published; it will summarize polls conducted in the central cities of the Russian Federation and American cities of comparable size. Speakers expressed satisfaction with this first experiment in cooperation by sociologists.

Collective works by psychologists were also compiled and published in the USSR and United States--"Cognition and Communication" and "The Problem of Development in Psychology." Joint seminars were held on the psychological aspects of labor, creativity and communication. Several joint projects have been planned by the subcommission on "Communications and Modern Society"--studies of ways of strengthening trust between countries, of spacebridge communications and so forth.

Studies of the labor movement and social change will focus on the following topics: the working class and world economic processes; scientific and technical progress and changes in the structure of the labor force; advances in the social awareness and organization of the laboring public. The papers of previous joint symposiums have already been published in both countries.

Jurists will study the following topics: public participation in government and legal regulation; crime prevention and problems in its improvement; the contract in domestic and foreign trade in the USSR and United States. Plans also call for the publication of anthologies and collective works in this field. "Our greatest concern is the quality of scientific research," a representative of the American jurists stated at the meeting. "And it must be said that our joint research is of the highest quality."

Thorough and comprehensive joint investigations are being conducted by literary critics of the two countries. Two joint works--"Leo Tolstoy and the United States" and "Mark Twain and Russia"--will be compiled and symposiums on these topics will be held as part of the project entitled "Russo-American Literary Relations in the 18th and 19th Centuries." The George Kennan Institute of Russian Area Studies organized a joint symposium on "The Prose of A. S. Pushkin," and the works of I. S. Turgenev will be the topic of a symposium in the USSR. Besides this, a symposium on "Sholokhov and Faulkner" has been planned. Other projects are being conducted within the framework of the general topics of "Russian Classical Literature" and "American Literature of the 19th and 20th Centuries." One interesting research project is entitled "Literature and Ethnic Awareness": Scholars have already met to discuss the Soviet literatures of the Central Asian republics and the literatures of ethnic minorities in the United States--Indian, Afro-American and Spanish-speaking. Future research will concentrate on the literatures of Latin American countries.

Colloquiums on comparative historical linguistics, linguistic contacts and linguistic classification are planned; in particular, the possibility of a joint project on computer-aided Russian language studies will be investigated. Productive research is also being conducted in the field of semiotics, and joint seminars have been held: one in Moscow and another at Brown University.

Valuable work is being performed through the efforts of both sides in the field of information and documentation in the social sciences. The possibilities of the exchange of information with the aid of modern technical means, including machine-read vehicles, are being analyzed; a Russo-English information retrieval language is being developed for one or two fields of the social sciences; a selective Soviet-American bibliography on the study of texts and a Russo-English dictionary of foreign policy terms are being compiled.

The process of environmental change in the USSR and United States and the geographic aspects of interaction by the population, the economy and the environment are being studied jointly in the field of social geography; several research topics are connected with the history of natural sciences and technology in the USSR and United States.

There is no room in a report of this length for a list of all of the promising research fields and topics investigated within the framework of the permanent agreement between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the ACLS.

During a break between sessions, the author of this article asked Professor R. Lumiansky, the head of the ACLS, to share his opinion of the Soviet-American commission's work. Here is what he said:

"I am completely in agreement with the optimistic view of our work expressed at the beginning of the meeting by its Soviet co-chairman, Academician G. A. Arbatov, and I also have only the highest praise for it. I would like to first underscore the scientific importance of our joint research and then make note of our contribution to the development of cooperation between the United

States and the USSR in the broad sense and to the search for mutual understanding between the people of the two countries, a good example of which is provided by the commission's work. Regardless of the reversals and zigzags in intergovernmental relations, we have continued to work effectively and without interruption and have continued meeting with Soviet scientists at least every other year at our sessions.

"Today I gave Academician G. A. Arbatov an armload of books recently published in the United States and based on the results of our joint research.... Yes, there have been some stagnant periods in our work, but on the whole we are happy. There is no question that we are moving ahead and that more and more of these jointly compiled books will be published! After all, these publications are not only a contribution to science; they are also a fine contribution to politics. They will be read by people who come to libraries, and not only in our two countries but in other corners of the world as well, and they will learn that although our views and appraisals might differ in some areas, this does not keep us from working together productively, finding a common language and studying various social phenomena jointly.... Therefore, we will influence public opinion and the political climate.

"My opinion of the Geneva meeting? I am personally pleased by the constructive results of this event. I am not a member of the American administration, but just an ordinary citizen, and one who often criticizes its actions. But at the time of the talks in Geneva, I, just as many other American citizens, was extremely excited....

"Against the background of global processes in world politics, the work of our commission might be almost invisible, but it is important in its own way. After all, we also aided in the search for a common meeting-ground. From this standpoint, our work is actually quite important."

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1985 PROCEEDINGS OF 99TH U.S. CONGRESS DETAILED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 86 (signed to press 19 Mar 86) pp 71-78

[Article by Yu. A. Ivanov: "The Longest Session"]

[Text] All of the members of the House of Representatives and a third of the senators will solicit the support of voters in the elections on 4 November this year. A fierce struggle is anticipated, during which the Democratic Party will attempt to win a majority in the Senate and thereby gain control of both houses of Congress. The position of Republicans in the Senate is quite vulnerable: There will be contenders for 22 of their 53 seats. Public opinion polls have invariably indicated that the budget deficit will be an extremely important campaign issue and that more than half of the voters believe that it cannot be reduced without cuts in military spending. It is understandable that these feelings are reflected in the position of many members of Congress, who have unenthusiastically agreed to further cuts in civilian programs: After all, many of their constituents benefit from these programs.

It was no coincidence that the first session of the 99th Congress, which concluded its work at the end of December 1985, ran 10 weeks longer than planned, lasting 11 months, and was the longest session since the start of the Reagan Administration. Nevertheless, in the words of R. Byrd (West Virginia), Democratic minority leader in the Senate, "from the standpoint of productivity and the development of legislation, this session was...the worst of all during my time in the Senate."¹ Several important bills--on immigration, on civil rights, on higher education, on a new pension system for federal employees and others--were not discussed or ratified during this last session.

All of these matters were overshadowed by the need to reduce the federal budget deficit, a problem which acquired unprecedented urgency in 1985; it was the central topic of discussions in the Capitol and the central issue of all domestic politics in the United States. In the last fiscal year the deficit exceeded 200 billion dollars, and this was only the latest of the unprecedented peacetime federal budget deficits marking all of the years of the current administration. As a result, the U.S. public debt more than doubled during these years and exceeds 2 trillion dollars.

More and more congressmen are realizing that a budget deficit of this size not only poses a serious threat to the American economy in the future but is also having adverse effects in the present, such as the relatively high interest rates and exchange rate of the dollar, increasing the deficit in the U.S. balance of payments.

The budget deficits are a direct result of the economic policy of the current administration, which immediately cut taxes and simultaneously increased military spending but also promised to balance the budget. As many economists warned and as the present situation testifies, this promise could never be kept.

The difficult task of reducing the budget deficit, a task which faced Congress on the threshold of the elections, is extremely unappealing from the political standpoint. Many in the Capitol realize that the most direct method of attaining this goal consists in some kind of cuts in the military budget, which has absorbed over a trillion dollars since Reagan entered the White House. But any congressman who openly advocates this will take the risk of being accused of "undermining national security" and even of "unpatriotic behavior" by the administration and its conservative allies. At the same time, by agreeing to cuts in civilian programs, the congressmen take the risk of alienating voters. For this reason, the behavior of the majority of members of Congress has been distinguished by the avoidance of unpleasant decisions, by the refusal to take political responsibility for them and by procrastination. As Congressman L. Panetta (Democrat, California) said when he summed up the results of the session, "each [of us] spent most of the time hiding in the trenches. No one wanted to appear determined."²

These tendencies were completely apparent during the discussion of the budget for fiscal year 1986, which dragged on for 6 months. The draft budget the administration submitted to Congress at the beginning of February 1985 envisaged the allocation of 313.7 billion dollars to the Pentagon and another 8.5 billion in military expenditures of other agencies, especially the Department of Energy, which produces nuclear ammunition. This would have signified an increase of 5.9 percent in the military budget over and above the adjustment for inflation and would have represented 29 percent of all budget expenditures. The draft simultaneously envisaged sharp cuts in expenditures on civilian needs. According to the estimates of the Congressional Budget Office, "the proposed cuts in non-military allocations are close to those President Reagan requested in 1981 and larger than the cuts in any subsequent year."³

The administration's proposed budget aroused criticism in the Capitol. Agreeing with the need to reduce the budget deficit, Republican Senate Majority Leader R. Dole (Kansas), Democratic House Majority Leader J. Wright (Texas), Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee P. Domenici (Republican, New Mexico) and Chairman of the House Budget Committee W. Gray (Democrat, Pennsylvania) insisted that if there was no other way of reducing the deficit than cuts in government programs, the military budget should also be reduced. The Republican-controlled Senate Budget Committee rejected the draft by a huge majority (17 to 4).

In the opinion of the WASHINGTON POST correspondent, it is probable that not even 35 of the 535 members of the two congressional houses would have supported the President's suggested rate of increase in military spending with a simultaneous refusal to increase taxes and the substantial reduction of social programs, affecting the interests of the middle strata as well as the poor.⁴ On 14 March the same committee approved its own draft budget, in accordance with which cuts in civilian spending in fiscal year 1986 would be accompanied by a military budget increase equivalent only to the rate of inflation--that is, around 3.4 percent.

The administration had a hostile response to the committee's decision. President Reagan firmly declared that "vitally important weapons systems, both conventional and strategic, must not be affected. And that is that!" The futility of hoping for congressional approval of the administration's request and the pressure exerted by the Capitol, however, forced the administration to agree to a compromise. In the beginning of April it was announced that Reagan had taken the position of the Republican leaders in the Senate into account in the compromise "package" of budget deficit proposals: The increase in military spending would be limited to 3 percent over the adjustment for inflation, but the civilian programs defended by the Budget Committee would either be cancelled or cut severely.

In May, however, the Senate rejected the budget resolution proposing a 3-percent increase in military spending and approved the amendment of Republicans C. Grassley (Iowa) and M. Hatfield (Oregon), envisaging an increase in military spending large enough only to compensate for inflation. Since the administration had no chance to change the Senate decision, and since the House of Representatives was apparently prepared to go even further, Reagan took the advice of the Republican leaders in the Senate and consented to this decision, announcing his support for it. It is true that, in exchange, the Republicans promised him that they would agree to a 3-percent increase in the military budget in fiscal years 1987 and 1988.

But even with the support of the President, it was difficult for the Republican leaders to push their draft budget resolution through the Senate. The vote was a tie (49 to 49), and the deciding vote had to be cast by Vice-President G. Bush. Four Republicans opposed to cuts in civilian programs voted against the resolution, and only one Democrat--E. Zorinsky (Nebraska)--supported it. The President had no choice but to put a good face on the matter. When he returned from his trip to Western Europe, he exclaimed with irony: "How pleasant it is to come back home and learn that a victory was won in the Senate by 50 votes against 49 in favor of cuts in spending with no rise in taxes!"

A few days later, on 16 May, the House Budget Committee approved its own draft resolution, also containing deficit reduction proposals. Reflecting the mood of the Democratic majority in the House, the committee agreed to cuts in some social programs but insisted on the retention of aid to the poor and the elderly, expenditures on education and some other programs the Senate intended to cut. As for military spending in FY 1986, the committee proposed that it be frozen on the previous year's level without any adjustment for inflation. The resolution was passed in the House at the end of May.

A conference committee of both houses began working on a budget resolution in the middle of June. It had the difficult task of coordinating the Senate draft, envisaging the cancellation of 13 non-military programs and jeopardizing old-age pensions, with the draft of the House of Representatives, envisaging the cancellation of only one such program and defending the interests of senior citizens. There were also major disagreements on the size of the military budget. The committee worked intermittently for more than a month and a half, and it was not until 1 August that the two houses approved a joint resolution, which, according to a 1974 law, should be prepared no later than 15 May. The House made concessions with regard to military expenditures, and they were set at 302.5 billion dollars. The Senate had to concede in the fight over pension security and some civilian programs.⁵

The budget resolution in itself, however, only stipulates the permissible limits of budgetary expenditures in each of the main fields. For this reason, its approval in Congress did not stop the fight over specific bills, especially the bills on appropriations for which it stipulates the maximum expenditures on each program included in the budget. The preparation of bills on appropriations was also delayed, for the same reasons as the budget resolution, and it was still going on for many weeks after 1 October (the beginning of the fiscal year in the United States). To avoid the interruption of the financing of government activity, Congress had to pass three resolutions allowing federal agencies to make regular expenditures on the level of the previous fiscal year.

By December only 6 of 13 bills on appropriations had been approved. The fight over the remaining 7, envisaging appropriations for the Pentagon, the departments of agriculture, the Treasury and transportation, and other agencies, continued until the very end of the session. They were approved only on the last day and became part of the summary bill on appropriations totaling 368 billion dollars. The White House threatened to veto the bill because its allocations for military purposes were supposedly too low and those for civilian programs were too high, but the President eventually had to agree and sign the bill. The level of civilian spending in it is lower than in the previous fiscal year, and total military expenditures are slightly higher.

Total military expenditures for the current fiscal year of 1986, as set in the act on appropriations, amount to 297.4 billion dollars. In absolute terms, this is the largest military budget of recent years; in comparison to the previous fiscal year it has risen approximately 2 percent, which is lower than the real rate of inflation in the United States. Therefore, there is some basis for the congressmen's statement that they were able to put a freeze on military budget growth in FY 1986 with only a small adjustment for inflation. But this was not accompanied by the refusal to finance large military programs: In general, appropriations for the creation and production of the sea-based D-5 ballistic missile, the Midgetman and the B-1 bomber were approximately equivalent to the administration's requests. The amount allocated for Reagan's "Star Wars" program was 2.75 billion dollars. This is almost twice as much as in the last fiscal year.

Therefore, it appears that Congress' current tactics with regard to the military budget consist in slowing down the growth of the total budget as much as

possible without refusing to continue the work on the main weapons programs, including strategic ones, but only slowing this work down slightly. The personal political interests of the members of Congress play a role in this process. Many of them realize that the military budget could be cut substantially by rejecting some large military programs, but the majority cannot take the risk of being accused of "unpatriotic" behavior by the administration and the conservatives, losing the financial support of local businessmen with an interest in such programs and taking the blame for layoffs and rising unemployment in their electoral districts; furthermore, the cancellation of ongoing programs would entail the payment of large forfeits to Pentagon contractors. For this reason, Congress is most likely to continue employing the same tactics in the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, during the past session, Congress imposed certain restrictions on two important strategic weapons programs--the MX missile and the anti-satellite weapon. The fierce struggle over the MX program, which has been going on since 1984, proved that extremely strong opposition groups had taken shape in both chambers, uniting the liberals protesting the arms race with many centrists and conservatives who believe that the deployment of the MX in existing silos will make these missiles too vulnerable. In 1984 Congress blocked the allocation of 1.5 billion dollars from the FY 1985 appropriations for the production of 21 missiles of this category until 1 March 1985, leaving the decision on the continuation of their production to the first session of the present Congress.

The struggle over the blocking of these funds was essentially the first test of strength in an important area of military policy between the administration of a President who had won the 1984 election and a new Congress. With a view to the congressional opposition to the MX missile's chances of success, the President and his advisers put forth considerable effort to attain their goal. A groundless rumor was spread, to the effect that the continuation of the production of the MX would promote the administration's success at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva. All top administration officials took part in the personal persuasion of members of Congress: the President himself, Vice-President G. Bush, Secretary of State G. Shultz, Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger and even former President G. Ford. They resorted to an unprecedented maneuver: The President recalled Democrat M. Kampelman, head of the American delegation, from Geneva to persuade the Democratic congressmen to support the MX program. Finally, Reagan himself set off for Capitol Hill and presented a speech in which he made every attempt to frighten the senators: "A vote against [the MX] will seriously weaken our national defense...and deprive our allies of their bearings.... While we are debating the matter, the Soviets are installing their missiles."⁶

Other means of pressuring the Congress were also used. The 22 Republican senators up for re-election in 1986 were categorically informed that if they did not vote on the MX program according to the White House's wishes, they could not expect the active support of the President in the campaign or in fund-raising. The traditional types of bargains between the White House and the Congress were also made. Congressman H. Rogers (Republican, Kentucky) was assured that the administration would pay closer attention to the program of

subsidies for the tobacco growers in his state, and he voted for the MX. The pressure campaign was joined by the lobbyists of corporations working on Pentagon MX contracts, particularly the Rockwell and Northrop firms.

The opponents of this program, however, defended their position quite resolutely. Calling the production of the MX "an outrageous waste of the taxpayers' money," Senator A. Cranston (Democrat, California) added that "the continuation of appropriations for the MX will weaken, and not strengthen, our national security and will also increase the budget deficit, which will hurt all of us."⁷ Senator P. Leahy (Democrat, Vermont) refuted the administration's statements by saying that "the MX will not serve as a 'trump card' [if only] because the administration has made it clear that it does not intend to discuss the future of this missile at the negotiation table in Geneva."⁸

It also became obvious that worries about the deficit were influencing the position of many members of Congress more than before. Congressman J. Pickle (Democrat, Texas) made an indicative remark in this connection. He said that he was not fundamentally opposed to the MX and had voted for it for many years, and that he was inclined in general to support the President in military matters, but "if the House seriously intends to reduce the colossal budget deficit, it will have to put reasonable limits on military spending. The first and most obvious step in this direction is the refusal of funds for the MX."⁹

The administration turned the blocking of MX funds into a matter of principle and was able to win a victory. The massive campaign launched to pressure the Congress produced results. Furthermore, in the House of Representatives the administration was supported by Chairman L. Aspin (Democrat, Wisconsin) of the Committee on the Armed Services. He was virtually the only Democratic leader to support the MX in these debates, but his prestige as the chairman of the committee and an acknowledged expert on military matters "soothed the conscience" of some hesitant Democrats, and they voted with the supporters of the MX. As a result, 55 senators voted in favor of releasing the funds for the MX while 45 voted against it. In the House, 219 voted for the release and 213 were opposed.

Famous American correspondent T. Wicker wrote at that time: "Reagan spent most of his political capital on a victory that might turn out to be pyrrhic. One result could be weaker support for the increase in military spending Reagan wants."¹⁰

The first signs of this weaker support were not slow in arriving. On the same day that the final vote on the release of funds for the MX was held in the House of Representatives, a group of Democratic senators supporting the administration in this matter proposed that the funding of the MX program in FY 1986 be limited to the production of 12 missiles instead of the 48 requested by the President, and that the number of missiles to be deployed in permanent silos be limited to 40. The authors of this proposal included S. Nunn (Georgia), A. Gore (Tennessee) and Senate Minority Leader R. Byrd. The Senate Committee on the Armed Services, controlled by Republicans, rejected the proposal but limited MX funding in FY 1986 to 21 missiles.

During the vote in the Senate, the radical proposal of the complete exclusion of MX funds from the bill was also rejected, but the results of the vote (56 to 42) clearly demonstrated the strength of the program's opponents. Addressing the Senate in favor of the cancellation of the MX program, G. Hart (Democrat, Colorado) said that "it is still not too late to stop this madness, and madness is the best name for the MX."¹¹

Senator Nunn's amendment had every chance of success, and the administration had no choice but to negotiate the matter. Nunn had this to say: "I am certain that they are aware of the possibility of defeat. Otherwise they would not agree to negotiations."¹² After 2 days a compromise was reached, and it was approved by the Senate on 23 May by a vote of 78 to 20. The terms of the compromise were essentially the following: a) In FY 1986 the number of MX missiles to be deployed in permanent silos would be limited to 50; b) this would be a permanent limitation, and not a temporary one, as the administration had hoped, and the text of the corresponding law would include the opinion of Congress (although it would not be binding) regarding the need to observe this limitation until such time as the administration could submit new basing proposals to the Congress; c) 12 MX missiles would be produced in FY 1986 and from 12 to 21 would be produced the following year, and they would not be deployed, but would be used only for tests or held in reserve. The final draft of the law on Pentagon appropriations reflects the administration's compromise with the Senate.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the Reagan Administration is not giving up its previous plans to raise the number of MX missiles to 100. This was announced by the U.S. secretary of the Air Force.

Another important decision Congress made in the military sphere during the appropriation of funds for FY 1986 was the imposition of a ban on tests of the antisatellite weapon (the ASAT program). It must be said that the unilateral moratorium announced by the Soviet Union in August 1983 on the emplacement of weapons of this type in space evoked a positive response in Congress, and since that time the antisatellite weapon has been actively debated on Capitol Hill each year. In FY 1984 the amendment of Senator P. Tsongas (Democrat, Massachusetts) prohibited the testing of this weapon on targets in space. In 1985 Congress gave in to strong administration pressure and consented to no more than three ASAT tests on targets in outer space, although it linked this consent with the administration's observance of several conditions.

During the discussion of military appropriations for the new fiscal year, the Senate again wanted to allow up to three tests of the antisatellite weapon, but the House voted to ban the tests as long as the USSR refrained from conducting them. The final draft of the bill drawn up by a conference committee, however, contained the Senate's wording.

But the opponents of ASAT tests in the House did not lay down their arms. In fall, when the bill on military appropriations was being discussed, Democrats N. Dicks (Washington) and L. AuCoin (Oregon) advocated a test ban, and the House passed a resolution of this kind. In the middle of December it became obvious that the congressional conference committee would probably support

this proposal. A statement approved by C. Weinberger was released, alleging that the prohibition of ASAT tests would "undermine arms control, jeopardize our [American] national security and waste money." Literally on the eve of the completion of the final draft of the bill on appropriations by the conference committee, the Pentagon launched two targets for the ASAT into space in an attempt to present the legislators with a fait accompli.

The congressionally approved act on appropriations for military needs in FY 1986, however, prohibits the expenditure of funds on the testing of anti-satellite weapons unless the President submits proof to the Congress that the Soviet Union is violating its declared moratorium. Furthermore, since it was learned that the administration intended to bypass this prohibition by financing the tests with allocations for other budget items, the wording of the law prohibits the expenditure of funds for this purpose on the basis of "any other law."

Commenting on Congress' decision, one of the opponents of the ASAT tests in the House, G. Brown (Democrat, California), stated: "If the President is serious about reducing nuclear weapons by 50 percent, he has to agree to the limitation of space weapons, and the moratorium will be the key to this."¹³

It must be said, however, that the congressionally approved act does not envisage the cessation of work on the ASAT program and even allocates 15 million dollars more than the administration requested for the creation of the system--165 million dollars. It also allocates 5 million dollars for "research programs for the development of new and improved methods of verifying the observance of any agreement that might be concluded by the United States and the USSR on antisatellite weapons."

Militaristic groups in the United States do not want to accept the congressional ban on ASAT tests. At the end of November the press reported that one of C. Weinberger's top aides was insisting that this ban be lifted. In response to this, Congressmen L. AuCoin and N. Dicks sent a letter to C. Weinberger to warn him that such tests would henceforth be "unlawful" and that any attempt to conduct the tests would have "the most serious consequences."

Important events occurred on Capitol Hill in the last weeks of the session. First of all, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment, which could have far-reaching effects with regard to the public debt, was adopted. Secondly, President Reagan had to save his tax reform bill after the Republicans in the House refused to support it.

The amendment introduced in the Senate by Republican P. Gramm (Texas) and W. Rudman (New Hampshire) and Democrat E. Hollings (South Carolina) to the bill raising Congress' "ceiling" on the public debt to 2.078 trillion dollars reflected, on the one hand, the serious concern in the Capitol about the unrestricted growth of the budget deficit and, on the other, the desire of the legislators to avoid political responsibility for the unpopular measures needed to reduce it. The amendment was approved 61 to 31 in the Senate and 271 to 154 in the House. It was supported by the majority of Republicans.

The votes of the Democrats in the Senate were split equally, and in the House 118 Democrats voted for the amendment and 130 voted against it.

The amendment sets maximum, annually declining limits on budget deficits for 5 fiscal years beginning with 1986. As a result of measures taken in accordance with this act of Congress, the budget deficit is supposed to be completely eliminated by FY 1991. The amendment stipulates the procedure by which the Congress and the White House will agree on cuts in spending to limit the size of the deficit. If they are unable to reach an agreement, in August of each year the Office of Management and Budget, the Congressional Budget Office and the General Accounting Office will submit a list of necessary cuts to the President, and he will issue an order putting them into effect no later than 15 October. The amendment envisages the equal distribution of automatic cuts among civilian and military programs. The Democrats were able to insist that appropriations for social insurance, veterans' pensions, some programs of aid to the poor and the payment of interest on the public debt would not be subject to automatic reduction. Some other social programs will be subject only to limited cuts (of 1 or 2 percent).

Although G. Shultz, C. Weinberger, Secretary of the Treasury J. Baker and many of the President's advisers warned him that this amendment could slash the military budget, Reagan signed the bill under pressure from the Capitol and it acquired the force of law. When he signed it, however, he expressed the certainty that Congress would nevertheless agree to a "constant increase--in real terms--in appropriations for defense."

Deliberately complicating the budget's already difficult path through the Congress, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment, in the words of D. Broder, renowned authority on the workings of government, "guarantees that President Reagan and the Congress will toss the deficit problem back and forth like a hot potato."¹⁴ By passing this amendment, Congress evaded any real solution and paid for this with the substantial restriction of its "power of the exchequer"--its constitutional right to determine the amounts of government revenues and expenditures. The Capitol could not even show enough determination in solving the budget deficit problem and attempted to substitute procedural innovations for real measures to evade responsibility. The amendment was called an "act of political desperation" by House Democratic leader J. Wright, who, incidentally, voted for it himself.¹⁵ As for the so-called automatic cuts in the military budget envisaged in the amendment, it is still difficult to say whether they will even be necessary: The constitutionality of the procedure stipulated in the amendment is already being argued in the courts.

As for the projected tax reform, which Reagan views as the chief aim of his second term in office, Republicans in the House voted against its discussion on 11 December. The shelved bill was prepared by the Democrat-controlled House Committee on Ways and Means, chaired by D. Rostenkowski (Democrat, Illinois), and it differed considerably from the administration's original proposal. But the White House was prepared to consent to it even in this form because the failure of the House to pass some kind of resolution would have prevented the discussion of the matter by the Senate, and then the President's

idea would have been buried in the Congress. He could not accept this possibility. He had to make an effort to stifle the Republican "rebellion" (this is how the situation was described in the press). He not only spoke personally with many influential members of his party in the White House but also went to the Capitol and asked the entire faction to change its position. These efforts were productive: Within a few days, just before the end of the session, the tax reform plan prepared by the Democrats was approved by the House. During the current session, which began on 20 January, this bill is supposed to be examined by the Senate; the White House hopes that the Republican-controlled Senate will approve a bill more acceptable to the administration.

Summing up the results of the first session of this Congress, Senator J. Heinz (Republican, Pennsylvania) said: "This session, however difficult it may have seemed, will look easy in comparison to the next one."¹⁶ It would be hard to disagree with this prediction: The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment has not alleviated the severity of the budget deficit problem, which haunted the first session like a nightmare, but has only postponed its resolution. We repeat that the difficult position of the members of Congress is compounded this year by the fact that many of them will be up for re-election in the fall. Not one of them can forget this for a moment.

FOOTNOTES

1. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 23 December 1985.
2. Ibid.
3. "An Analysis of the President's Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 1986," Congressional Budget Office, February 1985, p XVII.
4. THE WASHINGTON POST, 21 March 1985.
5. "First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget--Fiscal Year 1986," House of Representatives, Report 99-249, pp 23-24.
6. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 20 March 1985.
7. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 19 March 1985, p S3125.
8. Ibid., p S3129.
9. Ibid., 26 March 1985, p H1486.
10. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 2 April 1985.
11. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 23 May 1985.
12. Ibid.
13. THE WASHINGTON POST, 15 December 1985.

14. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 11 December 1985.

15. THE WASHINGTON POST, 15 December 1985.

16. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 23 December 1985.

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CSO: 1803/07

U.S. ANTHOLOGY ON NUCLEAR STRATEGY REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 86 (signed to press 19 Mar 86) pp 109-112

[Review by N. I. Bubnova of book "The Nuclear Reader. Strategy, Weapons, War," edited by C. W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985, XX + 332 pages]

[Text] This anthology is made up of articles and excerpts from articles, books and speeches on key issues of American politico-military strategy, arms programs and the approach to nuclear arms talks, published in the last 5 years and having great public repercussions in the United States. The authors include prominent American public spokesmen and politicians, such as former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, renowned American astronomer Carl Sagan, famous writer and journalist Jonathan Schell and leading American and West European experts on nuclear strategy: Wolfgang Panofsky, Joseph Nye, Alton Frye, Colin Gray and others.

The sharply diverging views expressed in this single set of articles paint a comprehensive and complex picture of the struggle over questions of U.S. politico-military strategy. The main issue on which the authors disagree is U.S. policy in international affairs. This clash is evident in all of the articles of the anthology. Furthermore, speeches in which the current politico-military line is criticized are indisputably in the majority in this book, and this gives them more weight in the overall expression of diverging opinions.

The rightwing position is supported primarily by works by Hudson Institute researcher K. Payne, President of the National Institute of Public Policy and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency adviser C. Gray, and President A. Wohlstetter of the Euro-American Institute of Security Studies.

Gray is the most belligerent of these representatives of extreme rightwing views. In his books and articles of the 1980's, he has defended the idea that nuclear weapons should be regarded as a means of realizing political ambitions and that the United States should be prepared for "controlled" warfare with minimum losses. He feels that the buildup of strategic weapons, including counterforce weapons, is necessary, as are more active measures in the sphere of civil defense, maximally securing the construction of a broad-scale antimissile system. In an article published in the anthology under the

heading "On the Road to Antimissile Defense," Gray actively supports the SDI, describing its implementation as a sequential move from the "limited" defense of ICBM silos to an all-encompassing ABM system, accompanied by the buildup of strategic offensive forces.

Wohlstetter preaches similar ideas. He proceeds from the assumption that, in view of the colossal destructive force of existing stockpiles, the sides will not dare to start an all-out nuclear war, and for this reason the potential for "mutual assured destruction" has lost its importance as a factor deterring the selective use of nuclear weapons. This fact, as well as the increasing accuracy of nuclear weapons, Wohlstetter asserts, will strengthen the probability of their use on a limited scale against distant targets in space or on the open seas, or for the destruction of military targets with high-altitude blasts. He alleges that the ensuing destruction and material losses will be negligible. The author ignores the political aspects of the probable nuclear conflict, to the advantage of the speculative scenarios he concocts solely on the basis of the military-technical potential of the newest and most promising types of weapons.

The purpose of this theorizing is merely to refute the idea that nuclear war is unthinkable, to vindicate nuclear weapons as means of implementing political strategy and to thereby substantiate the need for the accelerated buildup of nuclear arms, the creation of new types and systems of weapons and the improvement of their qualitative parameters. Furthermore, all of his arguments are based on the alleged need to "strengthen stability" with the aid of "more convincing deterrents" on any possible level of conflict. At the same time, Wohlstetter demands the enhancement of the combat capabilities of the conventional armed forces and arms of the United States and NATO.

The current American theories of "counterforce," "selective nuclear strikes," "escalation domination" and others are criticized in the anthology by well-known physicist and former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency researcher W. Panofsky, expert on international relations and University of South Carolina Professor E. Ravenal, University of South Carolina Professor P. Kattenburg, R. McNamara and others. These renowned U.S. experts on military and political issues believe that nuclear war--however it starts and whatever the intentions of the sides might be--will have unavoidable catastrophic consequences. They prove that the hope of controlling the escalation of hostilities and of stopping them "by agreement" before the war acquires the nature of an irreversible worldwide catastrophe deliberately ignores the colossal number of unknown factors inherent in any scenario of "limited nuclear war." The buildup of nuclear arms with the aid of the latest technology and the search for validating theories will, in their opinion, disrupt the military-strategic balance of power and international stability, increase the danger of nuclear war and erode the positive treaty basis of the arms limitation process.

"Today our number-one enemy," wrote one of the authors of the first section of the anthology, Theodore Draper, member of the American Academy of Liberal Arts and Exact Sciences and member of the Council on Foreign Relations, "is not the nuclear balance, which leads to mutual deterrence, but the propaganda about the permissibility of nuclear war due to the existence of precise and selective

types of weapons allegedly capable of causing no destruction" (p 36). Draper's article, entitled "Nuclear Temptations," is interesting because it is written in the form of a retrospective historical analysis. Draper explains that today's military-strategic concepts did not arise from a vacuum: Since the first years of the existence of nuclear weapons, attempts were made to find theoretical validation for the possibility of their use to attain military and political objectives. Draper writes that "nuclear temptations" always accompanied all new U.S. and NATO moves in the military sphere--from the adoption of the NATO strategy of "comprehensive deterrence," based on the concept of the "nuclear umbrella," and the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in the early 1950's to the recent deployment of cruise missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles on the territory of several West European countries.

As Draper demonstrates, theorizing to validate the "nuclear temptations" appeared to be confined within a vicious circle, never transcending the bounds of four main ideas--the "variety" of forms of nuclear war, its escalation from one stage to another, "flexible response" and "counterforce"--which were repeatedly expressed in various forms throughout the postwar period by the spokesmen of some U.S. administrations. The author shows how the new technological capabilities and theories always failed to strengthen U.S. security and even heightened the danger of nuclear war. Draper cites excerpts from his correspondence with Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger and statements by the latter, chosen to underscore the internal contradictions and inconsistency of the military-strategic views and declarations of the current Pentagon chief (it is not surprising that Weinberger's response to this article, according to the American press, was highly indignant).

Unfortunately, the valid criticism of the administration's military policy in the articles of the more realistic writers in the anthology suffers from the weakness of their arguments when they speak of alternatives. These authors counter the theorizing of Gray and Wohlstetter with the traditional postwar concept of "deterrence through intimidation" and with the NATO strategy of "flexible response" for Europe, concepts essentially intended to substantiate the power politics of the United States and the need for new weapons systems. They suggest that the buildup of arms intended for offensive warfare be replaced by the development of weapons systems allegedly serving exclusively as "deterrents" and reinforcing stability. Although they acknowledge the danger of the stockpiling of nuclear weapons, they nevertheless have little faith in any method of maintaining peace between nuclear powers other than a "balance of terror" or "structural terrorism"--this is the term the editors of the anthology use in reference to the contemporary system of international relations. They explain that "terrorism" signifies political actions intended to intimidate the civilian masses with the threat of annihilation, and they use the adjective "structural" because the nuclear threat is now an integral part of the structure of international relations.

It is particularly significant that there is not a single reference in the anthology to the Soviet initiatives in the sphere of arms limitation which point to realistic and effective ways of strengthening common security by means of the gradual reduction of weapons.

In addition, the criticism is objectively weakened by the absence of agreement on several fundamental issues. The authors have diverging views of the theory of "mutual assured destruction," which has been severely criticized by, in particular, the American Catholic clergy, whose famous message on questions of war and peace is included in the anthology. Serious disagreements arise in connection with the no-first-use proposal of several authors. There are also seriously diverging evaluations of current plans for the introduction of the latest models of conventional weapons, comparable to nuclear weapons in terms of force, accuracy and range.

The message of the Catholic clergy, for example, repeatedly underscores the need to emphasize the stepped-up development of conventional weapons.

R. McNamara is also convinced of the need for the immediate renewal of NATO non-nuclear weapons, believing that this will diminish the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons. E. Ravenal expresses the opposite point of view, stating that the elimination of the strict boundaries between nuclear and conventional weapons destroys the psychological barrier impeding the move from the use of conventional projectiles to the use of nuclear ones, and that this is precisely the chief danger of the arms race in our time.

The second part of the book, "Weapons," deals mainly with specific aspects of the military-strategic balance, the development of nuclear weapons and their limitation. The authors of these articles support or oppose the "Strategic Defense Initiative," discuss the nuclear freeze issue and present a detailed and comprehensive discussion of the issue of nuclear non-proliferation.

In his article, Steven Miller, the assistant director of the Harvard University Center on Science and International Relations, attempts to summarize the more than 10 years of experience in arms limitation, which, as the author states, cogently proves that it can be an effective instrument in the reinforcement of international and national security. Miller shows that the main obstacle in the path of arms limitation is not the issue of verification, which has been the subject of so much talk in the United States, and not the objective difficulties entailed in bilateral talks, but political opposition in the United States. When the basic U.S. position is being determined, he notes, the prevailing influence on the official line of the administration is exerted by military agencies, which want American proposals at the talks to have a minimal effect on new military programs. During the ratification of agreements on the matter, the influence of various pro-militarist groups grows stronger when they skillfully manipulate public opinion by speculating on negative factors in domestic politics and the international situation.

In an article entitled "Strategic Arms Reduction Through Modernization: The Road to Arms Restraint," A. Frye, the director of the Washington branch of the Council on Foreign Relations, presents a further discussion of arms limitation and zealously supports the idea of "reduction through modernization," which was proposed by the American side at the START negotiations in the end of 1983. He asserts that this proposal signalled a shift in Reagan administration strategy from attempts to achieve superiority to the reinforcement of the existing balance of power and strategic stability, and that its implementation would lead to the substantial and mutually beneficial reduction of strategic arsenals.

In fact, however, the main purpose of the plan for "reduction through modernization" consisted essentially in obtaining unilateral advantages for the United States--by means of disproportionately high reductions in the number of MIRV'ed ICBM warheads and the institution of a supplementary "subceiling" for the warheads of Soviet heavy ICBM's with only minimum restrictions on U.S. heavy bombers and cruise missiles.

The book ends on a high emotional note with a categorical denial of the permissibility of nuclear war. The last section is headed "War." The contents of the articles in this section testify once again that a nuclear war must never be started, that it will be impossible to fight a "limited," "selective" or "controlled" war, and that its consequences will be tragic for human civilization.

The article by Australian researcher Desmond Ball proves that the most important links of the control and communications system, primarily command posts and communication lines, will already be vulnerable at the beginning of a nuclear conflict, and this nullifies all hopes of effectively "controlling" the escalation of military operations. In Ball's opinion, it would be impossible to secure their invulnerability from the technical and financial standpoints.

The final article in the anthology is by famous astronomer and Pulitzer Prize winner Carl Sagan, who took part in studies of the climatic and biological effects of nuclear war in the 1980's. In this article based on the results of these studies, he writes about the catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons on the environment. In connection with the danger of the "nuclear winter" predicted by scientists, he writes persuasively about the urgent need for the substantial reduction of nuclear weapons and their total force at least to the point at which any increase could bring about the annihilation of human civilization.

In general, the book contains informative data on the conflicting approaches of various political groups in the United States to the issues of nuclear strategy, military organization and arms limitation.

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CSO: 1803/07

REVIEW OF BRITISH BOOK ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SECURITY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 86 (signed to press 19 Mar 86) pp 116-118

[Review by A. B. Pankin of book "The Choice: Nuclear Weapons vs. Security," edited by Gwyn Prince, London, The Hogarth Press, 1984, XX + 251 pages]

[Text] This collective work was written by American, English and Canadian writers who attended a seminar on NATO military policy at Cambridge University in Great Britain. The names and credentials of the authors are impressive: Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll occupied high positions on the U.S. naval staff; Admiral Noel Gaylor was the director of the National Security Agency, the most confidential U.S. intelligence agency, and the commander-in-chief of American forces in the Pacific; Raymond Garthoff occupied high positions in the CIA and the State Department and was the U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria; Lieutenant General K. Johnson was the chief of the chaplain service of the U.S. Armed Forces.

The publication of a book by these and other equally famous people (G. Kennan, J. Galbraith and M. Bundy) under a title which unequivocally states that nuclear weapons and security are incompatible, that they are mutually exclusive, is extremely indicative in itself. "The breach of unity in our community of strategists in the last 5 years is one of the most important phases of the nuclear age," says the introduction by Cambridge University Professor G. Prince, member of the international working group on military affairs, financed by the European Parliament to consider the possibility of a non-nuclear NATO strategy (pp X-XI).

First of all, why is there no unanimity in the so-called community of strategists? "Today our military strategy no longer corresponds to reality: It threatens our survival and does not safeguard the long-range security interests of the United States and the entire Western alliance," Lt Gen Collins, former deputy commander-in-chief of U.S. ground forces in Europe, answered this question, expressing the common opinion of the participants in the seminar and the authors of the book (p 29).

What are the basic premises of the authors contemplating NATO's political strategy? Prince writes: "A great deal of time at the seminar was devoted to the discussion of routine aspects of the military reform (of NATO--A. P.).

But as the seminar went on and as we began to construct the outlines of the future book, it became obvious that we should focus on matters taking logical priority over technical and tactical reforms" (pp VII-VIII). This means that the authors assign priority not to technical issues, but to political, ideological, moral, legal, psychological and other matters. They acknowledge that disarmament cannot be achieved on the level of experts without changes in the general political aims of Western strategy, without changes in Western beliefs about the policy of the Soviet Union and without a more democratic decision-making process in the sphere of military policy. This is the group of topics discussed in the book.

One section of the work is entitled "How Useful Are Nuclear Weapons." The authors ask a direct question: Can nuclear weapons be used, in any form whatsoever? Their answer is a categorical no. Admiral Gaylor writes: "I believe that nuclear weapons have no reasonable military function, whether these are 'strategic' weapons, 'tactical' weapons, theater weapons or weapons in the ocean or in space" (p 16). Gaylor arrived at this conclusion when he was still in a position of high command, when he was investigating the possibilities of using nuclear weapons as part of his duties. Analyzing various hypothetical situations, Gaylor proves that their use would be stupid, irrational and suicidal, that their use in any region would cost so many lives that it would make the very term "defense" meaningless.

In an article on "The Unimpressive Results of Atomic Diplomacy," McGeorge Bundy, former national security adviser in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, resolutely refutes the allegation that a country with nuclear strength has political advantages. He cites several examples from history, when the United States resorted to nuclear blackmail--for instance, during the war in Korea. But just the hint of the possible use of the atomic bomb, according to Bundy, upset the United States' allies more than its adversaries and aggravated relations with allies. In each specific case of "atomic diplomacy," Bundy writes, a thorough investigation of the "pros" and "cons" proved that neither the possession of nuclear weapons nor the threat of their use could be converted into political advantages (p 46).

In an article entitled "The Dilemmas and Delusions of Intimidation," Michael McGwire, senior research associate at the Brookings Institution and former naval attache in Moscow, examines the evolution of U.S. strategic concepts and the U.S. approach to arms control. The author analyzes the meaning with which the concept of "intimidation" and various concepts of arms control were invested by members of the American political elite. He does not ignore their differences of opinion, but he states that the supporters of arms control and the supporters of tougher and more forceful forms of "intimidation" were inclined to "view the Soviet threat as a given and to focus all differences of opinion on only one issue: the most probable cause of a Soviet attack--the desire for expansion or fear of the West" (p 79). This main premise was almost unquestioned and it was the foundation of the edifice of American strategic and politico-military doctrines. They "focused completely on Soviet military capabilities and paid no attention to Soviet interests, Soviet intentions or recent Soviet history," McGwire stresses (p 81).

He criticizes this approach severely, primarily because it hurts the United States itself. The false ideas about the "aggressiveness" of the USSR and the glaring contradiction lying at the basis of "intimidation," alleging that constant readiness to use nuclear weapons would guarantee their non-use, resulted in the accumulation of lethal weapons beyond all reasonable limits. Even "arms control became an extension of intimidation," the author of the article asserts (p 80). The desire to ascribe sinister plans to the Soviet Union and the portrayal of this country to the public as the culprit to blame for all problems the United States encounters abroad are poisoning the domestic political climate in the United States. Relations with Western Europe are also suffering because Western Europe has a more realistic view of the Soviet Union and is interested in broader cooperation with it. In fact, the author states, the type of behavior the United States ascribes to the Soviet Union and cites as evidence of the "Soviet threat" is contrary to the intentions and interests of the USSR. In essence, McGwire writes, the United States is defending itself against an imaginary danger, and defending itself to such a degree that it is jeopardizing its own survival.

Similar ideas are expressed, although in a broader sociopolitical context, by renowned historian and former diplomat George Kennan in an article entitled "The State of Soviet-American Relations." The author lists all of the facets of the Soviet way of life which he does not like, but emphasizes the main point: The USSR and its leadership do not want a war; they are willing to take sweeping measures to keep the peace. The author advises the examination of Soviet-American relations through the prism of the common interests of the two countries, including the interest in keeping the peace and in solving many global problems, which will be made possible only by cooperation and by stronger economic, scientific and cultural relations of equal benefit to both sides. He also makes the valid statement that "the two aspects of the relationship are intersupplementary. Progress in one area is necessary for progress in the other" (p 134).

John Griffith, professor of public law at the famous London School of Economics, argues in his article that the use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the standards of international law, intended to protect the rights of civilians and prohibit the most barbarous types of weapons and methods of warfare.

Analyzing the bases of the military-industrial complex' influence in social development, John Kenneth Galbraith remarks that the constantly growing awareness of the profound contradiction between the growth of military spending and the need to solve social problems could become a strong force capable of limiting the power of the military-industrial complex. Participation by the United States in one form or another in unpopular wars in Indochina, Central America and Lebanon, he believes, did much to discredit the role of military strength in the eyes of the public, but Americans nevertheless felt vulnerable in the military sense. According to Galbraith, these feelings could become a factor restraining the influence of the military-industrial complex if realistic politicians are able to bring the realities of the nuclear age to the attention of the general public and deprive the "experts" and "theologians of nuclear strategy" (p 208), in his words, of their monopoly on decisionmaking in matters of war and peace. The scholar has the highest praise for the

nuclear freeze movement, believing that it has already played a tremendous role in U.S. politics.

The concluding chapter, "The Solution: General Nuclear Regulation," written by Gaylor, suggests measures which, in the author's opinion, are in the mutual interest of the great powers and can be taken immediately. They are the resumption of calm and normal dialogue and the rejection of doctrines presupposing the possibility of nuclear war; the improvement and development of all types of relations and contacts on all levels and in all spheres between the USSR and the United States; the declaration of a mutual moratorium on the further development, testing and deployment of new types of nuclear weapons; the prevention of the spread of the nuclear arms race to new areas; the need for profound, rapid and continuous reductions of the number of nuclear weapons of all types. It is easy to see that these proposals essentially have much in common with the Soviet peace initiatives of recent years.

The recommendations of the authors of this book and their analysis of the current situation represent an important step toward the development of the new way of thinking Albert Einstein spoke of at the very beginning of the nuclear age, calling it necessary for the survival of the human race.

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CHRONICLE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS DECEMBER 1985-FEBRUARY 1986

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 86 (signed to press 19 Mar 86) pp 125-127

[Text] December

3-9 -- The sixth session of the commission of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the American Council of Learned Societies on contacts in the social sciences was held in Moscow. At the end of the session the two sides signed a protocol specifying the main fields of cooperation in 1986 and 1987.

5 -- The United States tested another nuclear device on a testing ground in Nevada. The force of the blast, according to a Department of Energy spokesman, was close to 150 kilotons.

9-11 -- The ninth annual meeting of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council (ASTEC) was held in Moscow.

10-16 -- A delegation of leaders of several U.S. peace organizations visited Moscow as the guests of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace.

14 -- The U.S. Air Force put two artificial satellites in orbit to serve as targets for the next test of the ASAT system.

18 -- General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev received Professor B. Lawn, co-chairman of the international movement "Physicians of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War."

20 -- As White House spokesman L. Speakes declared, the United States did not wish to join the Soviet Union in its announced unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests.

27 -- General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. I. Ryzhkov and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E. A. Shevardnadze received the heads of the diplomatic missions accredited in the Soviet Union. In his speech, M. S. Gorbachev remarked that the Soviet-American meeting in Geneva had made the overall international climate slightly

warmer and that the new opportunities thus created must be used to reduce the quantity of weapons and prevent the monstrous danger of an arms race in space.

28 -- According to a Department of Energy report, the United States tested a nuclear device with a force of up to 150 kilotons in Nevada. The purpose of the explosion was to test "laser technology" for the destruction of ICBM's.

30 -- A TASS statement was published in response to the U.S. administration's attempts to accuse the USSR of violating its international commitments in connection with arms limitation and reduction agreements.

31 -- TASS published a statement saying "the leadership of the Soviet Union feels that the continued testing of American nuclear weapons is contrary to the interests of resolving the central security issues representing the focal point of USSR-U.S. relations."

January

1 -- By mutual agreement, M. S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan delivered New Year's messages to the people of the United States of America and the people of the Soviet Union respectively. They were broadcast on the central television network of the USSR and national television networks in the United States.

15 -- Director C. Wick of the United States Information Agency (USIA) was received by USSR Minister of Culture P. N. Demichev when he was in the USSR. They discussed specific aspects of the general agreement on contacts, exchanges and cooperation in science, technology, education and culture and programs of cooperation and exchanges between the USSR and the United States during the 1986-1988 period, signed in Geneva in November 1985. The meeting was attended by U.S. Ambassador A. Hartman.

16 -- A statement by M. S. Gorbachev was published to announce a program for the sequential elimination of nuclear weapons from the earth by 2000 and to announce that the unilateral USSR moratorium on all nuclear tests, which expired on 31 December 1985, would be renewed for another 3 months. The United States was again asked to subscribe to this initiative.

16 -- The fourth round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons began in Geneva with a plenary session of the delegations.

17 -- Ronald Reagan made a speech in connection with the beginning of the fourth round of Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons and said that this round could give new momentum to the arms limitation talks. The President tried to abridge the negotiated context of the Geneva talks, however, by arbitrarily excluding the space component of the negotiations.

18 -- A press conference was held in Moscow in connection with M. S. Gorbachev's statement. It was conducted by USSR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs G. M. Korniyenko, Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, First Deputy Minister of Defense and Marshal of the Soviet Union S. F. Akhromeyev and Chief of the International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee I. M. Zamyatin.

20 -- A message from the USSR Supreme Soviet to the U.S. Congress was published. It says, in part: "By issuing this appeal on behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet, its Presidium expresses the hope that the American Congress and its members will lift their voices in support of the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons and in favor of a bilateral Soviet-American moratorium on all nuclear tests as the first step toward this goal."

21-30 -- Meetings of the following groups were held in Geneva as part of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons:

21, 28 -- The group on space weapons;

22, 29 -- The group on strategic weapons;

23, 30 -- The group on intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

28 -- The USSR and U.S. delegations at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament began a bilateral exchange of opinions in accordance with the agreement by M. S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan to promote more active efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on the total and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and to intensify bilateral discussions of all aspects of this matter by experts, including the issue of verification.

Speaking at a luncheon honoring Secretary-General A. Natta of the Italian Communist Party and the comrades accompanying him, M. S. Gorbachev said: "If the Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles on our continent could be eliminated without delay and without complicating the matter with other problems, we would probably untie one of the most intricate knots in world politics today--to a considerable extent, we could pave the way for the radical reduction of nuclear weapons and then for their complete elimination." He also said that "the USSR believes that the prevention of an arms race in space is an essential condition for the survival of mankind."

29 -- M. S. Gorbachev sent R. Reagan a telegram expressing condolences in connection with the tragic death of the "Challenger" crew. Academician A. P. Aleksandrov, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician V. A. Kotelnikov, chairman of the Interkosmos Council, and Soviet cosmonauts V. A. Shatalov, V. V. Ryumin, A. A. Leonov and V. N. Kubasov also expressed deepest condolences to the American colleagues and families of the deceased.

February

3 -- Chairman A. A. Gromyko of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium received a prominent American public spokesman and politician, former U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance, in the Kremlin when he was in the Soviet Union attending meetings of the Dartmouth Conference working group on Soviet-American relations. Academician G. A. Arbatov, director of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, also took part in the discussion.

4 -- Ronald Reagan presented his State of the Union Message to the Congress. In reference to Soviet-American relations, he said that the meeting in Geneva

and M. S. Gorbachev's scheduled trip to America could establish more stable relations between our countries. Nevertheless, the President repeated a set of hackneyed anti-Soviet stereotypes.

4-27 -- Meetings of the following groups were held in Geneva as part of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons:

4, 11, 18, 25 -- The group on space weapons;

5, 12, 19, 26 -- The group on strategic weapons;

6, 13, 20, 27 -- The group on intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

4-7 -- Famous U.S. public spokesman, Senator E. Kennedy, was in Moscow as the guest of the USSR Parliamentary Group.

6 -- M. S. Gorbachev received E. Kennedy in the Kremlin.

8 -- In his published responses to the questions of L'HUMANITE, M. S. Gorbachev repeated that if the American "Star Wars" program should be carried out, "the USSR and the United States, their allies and the entire world will have to contend with an absolutely uncontrollable arms race, strategic chaos, the most dangerous undermining of stability, general uncertainty and fear and the related mounting risk of catastrophe."

9 -- A TASS statement was published in connection with the decision of the American administration and the South Korean regime to conduct combat maneuvers codenamed "Team Spirit-86" in South Korea beginning on 10 February. The statement said that "these ostentatious military actions are conducted in direct proximity to Soviet Far Eastern borders and affect the security interests of the USSR."

10 -- The USSR and U.S. delegations at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament concluded the round of bilateral talks conducted in accordance with the agreement of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev and U.S. President R. Reagan to promote more active efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on a total and complete chemical weapon ban.

14 -- In a letter addressed to General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev, U.S. President R. Reagan acknowledged the condolences expressed in connection with the death of the "Challenger" crew.

18 -- New restrictions on USSR-U.S. scientific and technical contacts will be imposed on orders from the Pentagon. Soviet scientists will be denied access to several computer systems.

19 -- The Leningrad-Seattle Spacebridge was shown on the Central Television Network. Participants in the broadcast were workers, teachers, physicians and students.

20 -- Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs G. M. Korniyenko spoke with Ambassadors M. Kampelman, J. Tower and M. Glitman, the heads of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva. The meeting was attended by Ambassadors V. P. Karpov and A. A. Obukhov, the heads of the USSR delegation, and concerned matters discussed at these talks.

A message from M. S. Gorbachev to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, stating that, in all fairness, the first decisive step in the sequential elimination of nuclear weapons should "be taken by the Soviet Union and United States, which have the greatest nuclear potential," was published.

23 -- Speaking at a seminar on East-West relations at Vanderbilt University in Nashville (Tennessee), former U.S. President J. Carter asked the administration to give up the "Star Wars" plans. He called the SDI a "tragic mistake" and a "misleading theory."

24 -- General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev's book "Gryadushchiy vek mira" [The Coming Age of Peace] was published by the American Richardson and Stairman firm. It includes his reports, articles, speeches and interviews of 1985 and 1986.

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